THE EXPIRY OF PAPER IDENTITY CARDS ON 3 AUGUST 2026
19 April 2026
By Alessandro Fusillo
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. – 2. The Italian regulatory framework: TULPS, the Digital Administration Code and the distinction between identity cards valid and invalid for travel abroad. – 3. The introduction of the Electronic Identity Card as a digital identity document. 3.1. The origins of the CIE; 3.2. The CIE as an instrument of digital identity: its role within the eIDAS system; 3.3. Mandatory and optional data on the CIE: the regime under Art. 66 CAD; 3.4. The separation between the physical CIE document and digital identity: activation is optional; 3.5. The coexistence between the CIE and the paper format.– 4. Regulation (EU) 2019/1157 and Ministerial Circular no. 76/2025: fixing the expiry date at 3 August 2026. – 5. The survival of the paper format as a domestic document: compatibility with applicable law. – 6. The judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-61/22 and Regulation (EU) 2025/1208: confirmation that European rule-making exclusively governs travel documents. – 7. The legal status of ministerial circulars and their limits within the hierarchy of norms. – 8. Conclusions: paper cards expire for travel abroad but remain valid domestically; the remedy under Art. 45 of Presidential Decree no. 445/2000.
1. INTRODUCTION
Before 1914, a European travelled without a passport, without a visa, without a permit. One could cross the borders of the continent with nothing more than a railway ticket and one's word. Stefan Zweig recalls this lost world in the pages of The World of Yesterday with the melancholy of someone who knows he is describing something irretrievable: "We travelled without passports and without permits wherever we pleased; nobody asked about our ideas, our origin, our race or our religion." The Great War and the financial powers that orchestrated it shattered that freedom. Military exigencies necessitated population censuses, movement controls, the registration of suspects. It was then that the identity document was born in continental Europe as a systematic instrument of identification and surveillance — not as a public service to the citizen, but as an imperative of the State at war.
The Anglo-Saxon tradition experienced this tension with particular clarity. The United Kingdom had introduced identity cards in 1939 as a wartime emergency measure, and the Attlee Labour government retained them even after the war had ended. On 7 December 1950, in Finchley, London, a fifty-four-year-old dry-cleaning manager named Harry Willcock was stopped by the police while driving. Police Constable Harold Muckle asked him to produce his identity card. Willcock refused, uttering words that became famous: "I am a Liberal, and I am against this sort of thing." Prosecuted and convicted, Willcock appealed against the conviction. The case, Willcock v. Muckle 2 KB 844, was referred to a divisional court of seven judges presided over by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Goddard. The conviction was upheld on the merits, but Lord Goddard delivered remarks that would leave a lasting mark on British constitutional history: "This Act was passed for security purposes; it was not passed for the purposes for which it is now apparently being used. To use Acts of Parliament passed for particular purposes in wartime, when the war is a thing of the past, tends to turn law-abiding citizens into offenders, which is a very undesirable state of affairs." The following year, the Churchill government abolished British identity cards. Willcock, who had founded the Freedom Defence Association and publicly torn up his card outside the National Liberal Club, received hundreds of identity cards in the post over the following days, sent by citizens thanking him and donating them for a charity auction.
These two episodes — Zweig’s nostalgia for a passport-free Europe and Willcock’s civil campaign against the overreach of a wartime emergency converted into routine administration — provide the ideal backdrop against which to set the issue of the undue pressure being exerted by the Italian government to compel all citizens to obtain the new electronic identity card (Carta d’Identità Elettronica, CIE). Today, seventy-five years after Willcock v. Muckle, we once again face an administrative authority invoking security grounds — this time technical compliance with European standards for travel documents — to extend the reach of a piece of legislation far beyond its natural scope, transforming a deadline that concerns solely the validity of identity cards for travel abroad into a blanket invalidation of all existing identity documents, even for purely domestic use. This is not merely a technical question: it is a matter of civil liberty and the hierarchy of norms.
3 August 2026 is fast approaching as a watershed date for millions of Italian citizens who still hold a paper-format identity card. Municipalities and prefectures across Italy have launched public awareness campaigns, urging the population to renew the document before that date, accompanied by the assertion, presented as incontrovertible, that old cards will cease to be valid in their entirety: not merely for travel abroad, but also for any identification purposes on national territory.
The purpose of this analysis is to subject that assertion to critical scrutiny, examining the full spectrum of the relevant legal framework: from Italian public security legislation and general administrative law, through European regulations on the security of identity documents, to the implications of the ruling in which the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the first of those regulations invalid. The argument advanced here is that the deadline of 3 August 2026 operates fully and indisputably with respect to travel abroad and freedom of movement within the European Union, but lacks sufficient legal basis to extinguish the validity of paper documents as instruments of identification within the Italian domestic legal order.
This analysis is of not merely practical significance — directly affecting millions of individuals who, owing to age, circumstance, or simplicity of lifestyle, have not yet renewed their documents — but theoretical importance as well, touching upon constitutional issues such as the limits of European Union legislative competence, the legal nature of ministerial circulars, and the principle of the hierarchy of norms.
2. THE ITALIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: TULPS, THE DIGITAL ADMINISTRATION CODE AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CARDS VALID AND INVALID FOR TRAVEL ABROAD
2.1. The Consolidated Law on Public Security (TULPS)
The Italian identity card traces its statutory origins to Royal Decree no. 773 of 18 June 1931 (Consolidated Law on Public Security, TULPS), Article 3 of which obliges the Mayor to issue one to anyone who applies. In its essential simplicity, this provision draws no distinction between formats of the document nor does it impose specific technological requirements: the identity card is conceived as the primary instrument for certifying the personal identity of the citizen in dealings with public authorities and private entities with an interest in verifying an individual's personal details.
The rules governing documents equivalent to the identity card are instead contained in Presidential Decree 445/2000: Article 35(2) lists — alongside the identity card — passports, driving licences, nautical licences, pension booklets, firearms licences, and official identity badges issued by State administrations, provided they feature a photograph and an official stamp or equivalent marking. This catalogue confirms the approach of the Italian legal order, which does not concentrate the identification function into a single, technologically homogeneous document, but spreads that function across a multiplicity of instruments, each with its own characteristics.
The implementing regulations of the TULPS, set out in Royal Decree no. 635 of 6 May 1940, define the physical specifications of the identity card by reference to an official model. That model — the brownish folded paper document, which remained substantially unchanged for decades — has never been repealed by a rule of equal rank. Its replacement by the Electronic Identity Card has been progressive and, as will be seen, did not entail the formal abolition of the paper format, which remains available for exceptional cases.
2.2. The distinction between cards valid and invalid for travel abroad
A crucial feature of the Italian legal order, frequently overlooked in the current debate, is the distinction — already operating under existing law — between identity cards valid for travel abroad and cards not valid for travel abroad. This distinction was not introduced by European rules: it pre-existed them and is rooted in Italian law.
The Italian identity card is, as a rule, issued valid for travel abroad. The distinction between cards valid and invalid for travel abroad rests on Article 3 of the TULPS, which, in regulating the conditions for issuing the document, allows the Mayor to issue an identity card without validity for travel abroad in certain exhaustively defined circumstances: where there are criminal convictions that preclude by law the issuance of a passport, or where the citizen makes an express request to that effect. This power is detailed in Presidential Decree no. 649 of 6 August 1974 and in subsequent provisions on the matter. In such cases, the document bears the endorsement "Non valida per l'espatrio" (Not valid for travel abroad) and produces its identifying effects solely within national territory.
This distinction demonstrates that, in the Italian legal order, the function of a travel document and the function of a domestic identity document are legally separable and in fact separated: one and the same physical document may possess the latter but not the former, and the law recognises full evidentiary efficacy for identification purposes to a card devoid of validity for travel abroad.
2.3. Presidential Decree no. 445/2000 and Article 45: documentation by production
Presidential Decree no. 445 of 28 December 2000 (Consolidated Text on Administrative Documentation) governs the probative value of identity documents in administrative proceedings. As observed above, Article 35(2) defines "identity documents" (documenti di identità) — the identity card and other expressly listed equivalent documents, including passports, driving licences, and official identity badges issued by public administrations — and "recognition documents" (documenti di riconoscimento, being any document bearing a photograph issued by a public authority).
Article 45, entitled "Documentation by production", provides that details relating to surname, forename, place and date of birth, citizenship, marital status, and residence, certified in valid identity or recognition documents, may be proved by producing the documents themselves. The provision adds, in paragraph 3, that such details may also be used when the document has expired, provided that the person concerned declares at the foot of a photocopy of the document that the details contained therein have undergone no variation since the date of issue.
This provision — the "self-certification of an expired document" — is an administrative simplification mechanism of settled application in domestic administrative proceedings.
2.4. The optional nature of fingerprints in the Italian system
An aspect of particular significance, which institutional communications tend to omit, concerns the optional nature of fingerprints on the Italian identity card. Royal Decree no. 635 of 6 May 1940 (Implementing Regulations of the TULPS), at Article 289, provides for the mere option — not the obligation — of affixing the fingerprint of the holder's left index finger. The inclusion of a fingerprint is therefore an optional element, left to the choice of the holder and the recording of the official.
This fact is by no means trivial: it demonstrates that, in the traditional conception of the Italian legal order, the identity card does not presuppose biometric capture as a validity requirement for the document. The identifying function is discharged by the photograph, the civil registry particulars, and the holder's signature. That suffices, in the domestic legal system, to guarantee the identifiability of the person.
The subsequent regime governing the Electronic Identity Card introduced the mandatory collection of fingerprints, but — as will be seen — under the impetus of European rules specifically directed at travel documents, not through an autonomous choice of the Italian legal system regarding documents used purely for domestic identification.
3. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ELECTRONIC IDENTITY CARD AS A DIGITAL IDENTITY DOCUMENT
3.1. The origins of the CIE
The Electronic Identity Card (CIE) was introduced by Article 2(10) of Law no. 127 of 15 May 1997, which provided that the Minister of the Interior, acting jointly with the Ministers of Finance, Justice, and Public Administration, would define the specifications and procedures for issuing the identity card in electronic format. The subsequent Prime Ministerial Decree no. 437 of 22 October 1999 laid down the first regulations on the matter. Article 2(10) of Law no. 127 of 15 May 1997 was subsequently repealed, as was Article 36 of Presidential Decree 445/2000; at present, the rules governing the identity card are contained in Article 66 of Legislative Decree no. 82 of 7 March 2005 (Digital Administration Code).
The pilot phase lasted for an extended period, with issuance restricted to a small number of municipalities. By Decree of the Ministry of the Interior of 23 December 2015, the rollout of the CIE became nationwide, rolling out progressively between 2016 and 2021. Since 2021, the issuance of the CIE has essentially become the standard method, with the paper card reserved for expressly identified exceptional circumstances.
3.2. The CIE as an instrument of digital identity: its role within the eIDAS system
The CIE is not merely a physical identity document. It incorporates an NFC microchip containing the holder's biometric data — photograph and fingerprints — as well as a cryptographic authentication system enabling its use as a strong digital identification tool for accessing online public administration services.
The Digital Administration Code (Legislative Decree no. 82 of 7 March 2005, CAD) has progressively integrated the CIE into the national digital identity framework. Article 64 of the CAD governs the SPID system (Public Digital Identity System), within which the CIE constitutes one of the recognised means of authentication, carrying the highest level of security (Level 3).
Regulation (EU) no. 910/2014 (eIDAS), on electronic identification and trust services, established the European framework into which the CIE fits as an electronic identification means. In this context, the CIE serves as a bridge between physical and digital identity, enabling citizens to access online public services across Member States with a harmonised level of security. Recital 14 of Regulation 2025/1208 confirms that the legislation on biometric documents "does not affect Regulation (EU) No 910/2014", proving that the two regulatory schemes have distinct scopes of application.
3.3. Mandatory and optional data on the CIE: the regime under Art. 66 CAD and the distinction between CIE for travel abroad and CIE for domestic use
An aspect of substantial practical significance — systematically passed over in silence in official communications — concerns the regime governing the data that the CIE must mandatorily contain. Article 66(3) and (4) of Legislative Decree no. 82 of 7 March 2005 (CAD) distinguishes between mandatory data and optional data. Only basic identifying personal details (forename, surname, place and date of birth) and the tax code (codice fiscale) are mandatory. By contrast, blood group, organ donation preferences, biometric data — DNA being excluded in any event — as well as telephone numbers and email addresses are optional, and may be omitted at the request of the holder.
This provision of the CAD — a primary statute — constitutes the hierarchically superior source of law over ministerial decrees (such as Ministerial Decree of 23 December 2015 and Ministerial Decree of 8 September 2022) and local municipal practices that sometimes mistakenly present the collection of fingerprints as compulsory. It is therefore legally sound for an applicant for a CIE to refuse consent to fingerprinting: the municipality in such cases is bound to issue the document without those biometric data, with the consequence — this one indeed imposed by the European Regulation — that the card will not be valid for travel abroad.
A distinction must also be drawn within the CIE between its function as a travel document — for which fingerprints are required under Regulation (EU) 2025/1208 (Art. 3(5)) — and its function as an identity document for domestic use, in respect of which the CAD prevails and renders fingerprints optional. Furthermore, Article 10(3) of Regulation 2025/1208 itself imposes the obligation to erase biometric data from the systems of the issuing authority within 90 days of document collection: this confirms that fingerprints are not intended to form a permanent database, but serve exclusively to personalise the chip of the physical document.
3.4. The separation between the physical CIE document and digital identity: activation is optional
A second little-known aspect concerns the distinction between the CIE as a physical document and the CIE as an online digital identity tool. The physical document is valid and produces its identifying effects immediately upon delivery by the municipality, without any requirement of activation. The CieID mobile app, which enables digital authentication for online public administration services, is an additional and optional service that has no bearing on the validity of the physical document.
Recital 15 of Regulation 2025/1208 expressly clarifies that the regulation "does not cover the use of identity cards and residence documents with electronic identity card functions by the Member States for other purposes". The digital identity function is therefore a distinct and autonomous tier compared to the documentary function: a holder who does not wish to avail themselves of online digital identification features can simply refrain from activating the CIE as an electronic tool, using the physical document exactly as they would have used the paper card. This separation is also relevant to privacy considerations: activating the CIE digital identity entails creating a traceable identity across every access to online services, whereas using the physical document does not, in itself, generate any electronic log.
3.5. The coexistence between the CIE and the paper format
It is important to clarify that the introduction of the CIE did not entail the formal repeal of the paper identity card. Circular no. 4 of 3 April 2017 of the Ministry of the Interior established that issuing the paper format is permissible in cases of "genuine and documented urgency" relating to health reasons, imminent travel, elections, and participation in public competitions. Similarly, paper documents continued to be issued to citizens registered with AIRE (Registry of Italians Residing Abroad) through consulates, which had not been equipped with the CIE system in a timely manner.
This normative coexistence — the electronic card as the rule, the paper document as a regulated exception — is the necessary starting point for understanding the issue of the 3 August 2026 deadline: before even examining the effects of European law, one must ask whether and how Italian law has provided for the termination of the validity of paper cards already in circulation.
4. REGULATION (EU) 2019/1157 AND MINISTERIAL CIRCULAR NO. 76/2025: FIXING THE EXPIRY DATE AT 3 AUGUST 2026
4.1. Regulation (EU) 2019/1157: origins and objectives
Regulation (EU) 2019/1157 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 was adopted with the stated objective of "strengthening the security of identity cards of Union citizens and of residence documents issued to Union citizens and their family members exercising their right of free movement". Its origins are closely linked to the recorded increase in document fraud.
The regulation requires Member States to issue identity cards in ID-1 format featuring a machine-readable zone (MRZ) and an NFC chip containing biometric data. Article 5 governs the "phasing-out" of old non-compliant documents, distinguishing two categories: under paragraph 2(a), cards that do not meet the minimum security standards set out in ICAO Document 9303 or that do not include a functional MRZ cease to be valid at their expiry or by 3 August 2026, whichever is earlier; under paragraph 1, cards that comply with ICAO requirements, but not fully with the regulation, cease to be valid by 3 August 2031.
Italian paper identity cards fall into the first category, as they lack an MRZ. Hence the date of 3 August 2026 as the premature expiry deadline imposed by the European regulation.
4.2. Circular no. 76 of 13 October 2025 of the Ministry of the Interior
The Ministry of the Interior, by DAIT Circular no. 76 of 13 October 2025, purported to implement Regulation (EU) 2019/1157 by notifying municipalities and prefectures that paper identity cards currently in circulation remain valid exclusively until 3 August 2026, regardless of the expiry date printed on the document.
The most significant — and most contestable — passage of the circular is where it, adopting an opinion of the Department of Public Administration, asserts that paper cards will no longer be valid "not only for travel abroad, but also on national territory". The circular justifies this conclusion on the grounds that Regulation (EU) 2019/1157 "does not distinguish between identity cards intended exclusively for domestic use and those used as documents valid for travel abroad", thereby extending the scope of the regulation to all identity cards issued by municipalities, with the sole exception of provisional documents having a validity of less than six months.
This interpretation is untenable in light of the text of the Regulation, its legal basis, and the judgment of the Court of Justice which struck down Regulation 2019/1157 for lack of a proper legal basis, requiring the measure to be re-enacted on a TFEU legal basis (Art. 77) exclusively linked to border controls, resulting in the adoption of the new Regulation 2025/1208.
5. THE SURVIVAL OF THE PAPER FORMAT AS A DOMESTIC DOCUMENT: COMPATIBILITY WITH APPLICABLE LAW
5.1. The issue: is the issuance of cards not valid for travel abroad conceivable?
Before addressing the validity of existing paper cards after 3 August 2026, it is worth pausing over a preliminary question prompted by this state of affairs: can the Italian Republic continue to issue, even after that date, identity cards in paper format or at any rate devoid of fingerprints, specifically designated for domestic use and stating expressly that they are documents not valid for travel abroad?
The answer to this question is, at least in principle, in the affirmative. Domestic law does not prohibit, and indeed expressly provides for, the distinction between cards valid and not valid for travel abroad. An identity card bearing the endorsement "Non valida per l'espatrio" does not fall within the scope of application of the European Regulation — as confirmed by Recital 11 of Regulation 2025/1208, which expressly excludes from the scope of the regulation "identification documents issued to citizens whose right to free movement has been restricted" and "which expressly indicate that they cannot be used as travel documents".
In this scenario, Italy could maintain, alongside the CIE as the standard travel document, a simplified format of identity card for domestic use only, aimed in particular at the elderly, at individuals with difficulties accessing digital systems, or in urgent circumstances. Such a document would not infringe European law, as it is not intended for travel abroad, and would find full legitimacy within the State's normative autonomy regarding domestic identity documents.
Naturally, such a policy choice would require primary legislation or at least a regulatory decree, not a mere ministerial circular. Parliament or the Government could adopt one, but have not done so to date. Circular 76/2025 has instead taken the opposite path, extending the consequences of the European rules to domestic use as well.
5.2. The validity of existing paper cards for domestic use
Distinct, and more pressing from a practical perspective, is the question of paper cards already in circulation. The contention in Circular 76/2025 — that they lose all validity, even domestically, from 3 August 2026 — lacks adequate statutory foundation. This is so for several reasons.
First, the TULPS (Art. 3, R.D. 773/1931) and its implementing regulations have not been repealed or amended. The former establishes the Mayor's obligation to issue an identity card; the latter defines the specifications of the document. These rules remain in force and recognise as valid for identification purposes identity cards issued in conformity with the prevailing model, without imposing additional technological requirements for the sole function of domestic identification.
Second, Presidential Decree 445/2000 has not been amended. Article 35 continues to classify identity cards issued by municipal authorities as "identity documents", without distinction as to format, and Article 45 continues to govern their probative value in administrative proceedings.
Finally, the European Regulation upon which the circular relies has a scope of application confined to documents for free movement within the EU; it does not extend to identity documents for domestic use, and its legal basis precludes the European Union from having the competence to regulate the latter.
6. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN CASE C-61/22 AND REGULATION (EU) 2025/1208: EUROPEAN RULE-MAKING EXCLUSIVELY GOVERNS TRAVEL DOCUMENTS
6.1. The Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden judgment (CJEU, 21 March 2024, C-61/22)
An element of extraordinary importance, completely absent from the Italian public debate surrounding the 3 August 2026 deadline, is that Regulation (EU) 2019/1157 — upon which the entire edifice of the ministerial circular rests — was declared invalid by the Court of Justice of the European Union by judgment of 21 March 2024 in Case C-61/22, Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden.
The Court held that the regulation had been erroneously adopted on the basis of Article 21(2) TFEU (which confers upon the European Parliament and the Council the power to adopt provisions with a view to facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights to move and reside freely), whereas the correct legal basis ought to have been Article 77(3) TFEU. The latter provides that "the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may adopt provisions concerning passports, identity cards, residence permits or any other equivalent document" with a view to facilitating the exercise of the right referred to in Article 20(2)(a) TFEU, namely the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.
The Court clarified, however, that the invalidity of the regulation did not entail its immediate inapplicability: to prevent a legal vacuum, it maintained the effects of the invalid regulation until the adoption of a replacement act, up to a maximum period of two years. That new Regulation was adopted in 2025 (2025/1208).
6.2. Legal implications of the change in legal basis
The shift from Article 21(2) TFEU to Article 77(3) TFEU as the correct legal basis is not a mere formal technicality: it produces substantial consequences of great import for the issue under examination.
Article 77 TFEU is situated in Title V of Part Three of the TFEU, headed "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice". Paragraph 3 confers upon the Council the power to adopt measures "concerning passports, identity cards, residence permits or any other equivalent document" solely "with a view to facilitating the exercise of the right referred to in Article 20(2)(a)" — that is, the right to move and reside freely. Construed systematically alongside the preceding paragraphs of Article 77 (which deal with external border controls, common visa policy, and border management systems), this provision makes clear that Union competence in respect of identity documents is strictly instrumental to border management and cross-border freedom of movement.
As observed in scholarly commentary (cf. A. Lang, "Pubblicato il nuovo regolamento sulle carte d'identità biometriche", Eurojus, 2025), reliance on Article 77 TFEU as a legal basis "highlights the instrumental nature of the new regulation to the proper functioning of the Schengen area". It follows that the regulation governs documents in their function as instruments for crossing the internal borders of the Union, not in their function as identity documents for the purposes of each Member State's domestic legal order.
6.3. Regulation (EU) 2025/1208: confirmation of scope restricted to EU free movement
The new Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1208 of 12 June 2025 — adopted on the basis of Article 77(3) TFEU to replace the invalidated regulation — confirms even more unequivocally the boundaries of European legislation, as established by an analysis of its text.
Article 2, which defines the scope of application, provides that the regulation applies to identity cards issued by Member States "referred to in Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC". The express reference to the Free Movement Directive is not coincidental: it designates identity cards as the subject matter of the regulation to the extent that they serve as instruments for the exercise of the right of free movement, not generically as identity documents for domestic use. Not a single provision of Article 2 mentions domestic identification.
Recital 11 of Regulation 2025/1208 — corresponding to Recital 13 of the old Regulation 2019/1157, with merely a grammatical change from plural to singular — explicitly provides:
"Identification documents issued to citizens whose right of free movement has been restricted in accordance with Union or national law, and which expressly indicate that they cannot be used as travel documents, should not be considered as falling within the scope of this Regulation."
Read positively, this provision confirms that the regulation applies to documents in their capacity as "travel documents". A document that is not valid for travel abroad falls, by definition, outside the scope of the regulation.
Recital 10 adds a further element: the regulation "does not prevent Member States from accepting, on a non-discriminatory basis, documents other than travel documents for identification purposes, such as driving licences". The reference to driving licences as acceptable domestic identification instruments at the discretion of the Member States confirms that domestic identification functions are left to state sovereignty, not governed by the European regulation.
Recital 46 — the subsidiarity clause, which under Union drafting practice sets out the objectives of the act — leaves no room for doubt: the regulation aims to "strengthen the security of and facilitate the exercise of the right to free movement by Union citizens". There is no mention of domestic identification use.
Finally, Recital 9 introduces a novelty compared to the old regulation: it states that the new act "is without prejudice to the principle, established in the case law of the Court of Justice, that entitlement to the right of free movement and residence may be proved by any means of proof". If the right to free movement can be demonstrated by any means, then a fortiori simple domestic identification — which does not trigger the machinery of EU free movement — cannot be made conditional upon compliance with the technical standards of the European regulation.
6.4. The European Union has no competence to regulate identity documents for domestic use
The picture that emerges is unequivocal: the European Union does not possess, under the Treaties, a legal basis empowering it to regulate identity documents for the domestic use of the Member States.
Under the principle of conferral (Article 5 TEU), the Union may act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Treaties. Article 21 TFEU, properly construed — as clarified by the Court of Justice — confers competence regarding free movement. Article 77 TFEU governs border checks. Neither legal basis extends to the regulation of identity documents in their domestic function.
Under the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5(3) TEU), even in areas of shared competence, the Union may legislate only if the objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States. The identification of its own citizens on national territory is, by definition, a sovereign state function, exercised according to rules determined autonomously by each State.
Under the principle of proportionality (Article 5(4) TEU), imposing technical requirements solely on travel documents is proportionate to border security objectives; extending those same requirements to instruments of pure domestic identification, with the consequent invalidation of documents lawfully issued upon which the holders have legitimately relied, would instead be disproportionate to those objectives.
7. THE LEGAL STATUS OF MINISTERIAL CIRCULARS AND THEIR LIMITS WITHIN THE HIERARCHY OF NORMS
7.1. The legal nature of ministerial circulars
Ministerial Circular no. 76/2025 is not a source of law. Within the hierarchy of norms of the Italian legal order, circulars occupy a clearly defined position: they are internal administrative acts addressed to the organs and offices of the recipient administration (in this case: municipalities, prefectures, registry offices) to guide their operations. They are not binding on private individuals, cannot innovate the legal order, and have no power to repeal or derogate from statutory or regulatory provisions.
Administrative jurisprudence consistently holds that circulars may lawfully be disapplied by the courts — and pleaded as unlawful by any private party prejudiced by them — whenever their content conflicts with a superior rule of law. It is a well-established principle that a circular is not a source of law and cannot alter primary legislation (cf. Court of Cassation, Joint Chambers, 27 December 2016, no. 26993; Council of State, Section II, 11 February 2025, no. 1098; Council of State, Section III, 19 December 2024, no. 10223).
7.2. The untenability of the circular's reasoning within the hierarchy of norms
Circular 76/2025 purports to produce an effect — the invalidation of documents for domestic use — that would require a rule of at least primary rank (an ordinary statute or, if grounded in EU law, a European regulation applicable to domestic use). In reality:
(a) The European Regulation upon which it is based (2019/1157, now replaced by 2025/1208) has a scope of application limited to documents for EU free movement, as demonstrated. It does not regulate identity documents for domestic use, and its legal basis precludes it from doing so.
(b) Italian primary legislation (TULPS, Presidential Decree 445/2000) has not been amended. These provisions continue to recognise identity cards issued by municipalities as valid, without imposing technological requirements for domestic identification purposes.
(c) No statutory or regulatory provision of Italian law has ordained the invalidation of paper cards for domestic use with effect from 3 August 2026. A circular cannot create such a rule: it can at most interpret existing rules, not introduce new ones.
(d) The opinion of the Department of Public Administration, cited in the circular as the linchpin of its expansive interpretation, is likewise an internal administrative act, not binding on private individuals and incapable of filling statutory lacunae.
In conclusion, the proposition that paper cards will lose all validity — including domestically — from 3 August 2026 is unsupported by any legal rule of appropriate rank. The circular, as an administrative act, may guide the conduct of public bodies, but cannot modify the substantive rights of citizens nor alter the legal system regarding the evidentiary efficacy of documents.
8. CONCLUSIONS: PAPER CARDS EXPIRE FOR TRAVEL ABROAD BUT REMAIN VALID FOR DOMESTIC USE; THE REMEDY UNDER ART. 45 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 445/2000
8.1. Summary of conclusions
The foregoing analysis allows for the following conclusions, structured by normative tier:
Under European law: Regulation (EU) 2025/1208 — which replaced Regulation 2019/1157 declared invalid by the Court of Justice — regulates identity cards exclusively in their function as documents for exercising the right to free movement within the territory of the European Union. Its scope of application, defined by Article 2 by reference to Directive 2004/38/EC, does not extend to identity documents for domestic use. The legal basis (Article 77(3) TFEU) and the purpose of the act (security of travel documents for border check purposes) corroborate this reading. The European Union possesses no competence to govern domestic identification within individual Member States.
Regarding the 3 August 2026 deadline: it operates certainly and definitively with respect to the use of paper cards as documents for travel abroad and free movement within the European Union. From 4 August 2026, an Italian citizen will not be able to present their paper card to cross an EU border or to exercise free movement rights in the Schengen area. On this point, the European Regulation is capable of directly producing effects within the Italian legal order.
Regarding domestic identification use: the paper identity card retains its legal validity in the Italian legal order even after 3 August 2026, since the national statutes governing it (TULPS, Presidential Decree 445/2000) have not been amended, and the European Regulation — for the reasons set out above — neither had nor could have had the effect of rendering it ineffective for these purposes.
Regarding the legal status of the circular: Circular no. 76/2025 of the Ministry of the Interior does not have the force of a source of law. It may guide the conduct of public offices, but does not bind private individuals and is incapable of altering the legal validity of documents for domestic use, which is determined by applicable primary legislation and regulations. Private parties adversely affected by the application of the circular could challenge it before the courts, pleading its incompatibility with superior rules of law.
8.2. The remedy under Art. 45 of Presidential Decree no. 445/2000
By way of further precaution, and should one need to counter any dispute over the document's validity, attention is drawn to Article 45(3) of Presidential Decree no. 445/2000. That provision establishes that details contained in an identity document "may be used in administrative proceedings and produced to the responsible official, even if the document has expired", on condition that the person concerned declares at the foot of the photocopy of the document that the details contained therein have not changed since the date of issue.
This provision — the self-certification of an expired document — applies equally to the 3 August 2026 expiry date, should the paper card be treated as "expired" for purely domestic purposes from that date onward. A citizen in possession of a paper card may continue to produce the document, accompanied by the declaration under Article 45(3), in all administrative proceedings that require the production of identification documents.
8.3. Observations on legal policy
Institutional communications presenting the deadline of 3 August 2026 as an absolute and total event, without distinguishing — as correct legal analysis requires — between the expiry for travel abroad (certain and definitive) and the alleged expiry for domestic use (unsupported by an adequate statutory basis), are, as usual, misleading and erroneous, and evidently aimed at nudging the public into opting for the CIE. Ruling out the possibility that such a legislative policy choice — conspicuously absent from public debate and from the otherwise hollow and meaningless "election promises" — could be intended to benefit citizens, one must question the real reasons behind such a drive towards the comprehensive digitalisation of life and, above all, of every interaction between citizens and public authority in its multiform manifestations. In this context, an individual's existence and their ability to assert themselves as holders of rights and obligations are subordinated to being registered within an IT platform (that of digital identity management) which entrusts the decision on the continuity of one's status as a citizen and legal subject to a technological computing architecture. The ideal objective pursued is to enclose within a single mobile phone app one's digital identity, an array of documents (driving licence, health insurance card, academic qualifications, income certifications such as the ISEE, etc.) and, ultimately, the digital currency destined to supplant not only physical cash but also electronic book-entry money (current accounts and bank cards). These tools enable the acquisition of comprehensive and all-encompassing control over the daily lives of everyone. Indeed, placing restrictions on the usability of various digital documents becomes a mere technical matter of managing control algorithms. Likewise, the ownership of money itself could be restricted with extreme ease through centralised control instruments entrusted to artificial intelligence systems.
Money is the end-point of this legislative evolution, of which the electronic identity card constitutes a cornerstone. Money itself already no longer represents a property right, since it is merely a debt claim held against a bank — in a bank deposit, the credit institution acquires ownership of the money deposited by the customer and undertakes to repay it on demand. Consequently, one can speak of ownership in legally correct terms only in relation to physical banknotes, to which the principle "possession is nine-tenths of the law" (possesso vale titolo) applies and which remain under the direct control of the owner. With book-entry and electronic money, and all the more so with digital currency, control over the ownership of money operates through the mediation of an intermediary. Whereas the current banking system comprises a plurality of intermediaries, albeit gathered in a cartel overseen by central banks, with digital currency control shifts into the hands of a single operator. Official communications will tend to present this central planner as a trustworthy public body (governments, central banks, independent agencies), but for all practical purposes the control platform will reside in the hands of the corporations that supply governments with this type of digital infrastructure.
The CIE is not merely a more secure document: it is a device that collects biometric data, integrates with centralised digital authentication systems, and enables the tracking of citizens' interactions with public administration and private bodies alike. Recital 21 of Regulation 2025/1208 expressly regulates access by private entities to the facial image stored on the chip, opening up global surveillance scenarios that go far beyond the border security purposes originally invoked. The fact that Circular 76/2025 attempts to bypass through interpretation the decision to confine the effects of the new European rules to the sole sphere of free movement — and thus to travel abroad and the management of internal EU borders — is a serious warning sign. It lends substantial credence to concerns over a political push towards comprehensive digitalisation that will not only further marginalise all those who, for reasons of age or financial circumstance, cannot or do not wish to adopt new technologies, but will also help lock everyone else into a system of total control: a modern Panopticon constructed with computers and artificial intelligence. Although public communications tend to present digital identity innovations through the rhetoric of the triumphant march of new technologies prevailing because they are more convenient, more secure, and more efficient, the reality is that we are far from seeing a response to a genuine, grassroots demand. This is a top-down imposition, serving the realisation of a dystopian vision of central planning.
For this reason, boycotting represents the most effective means of resistance. This is not simply a matter of introducing a neo-Luddite element into political discussion, but of using the most effective tool of resistance available to citizens. Boycotting the digital identity card and its associated mobile apps (for example, by choosing a passport instead) is part of a widespread resistance movement capable of dismantling the global control designs embedded in the push towards digital identity. The CIE is a Trojan horse. Mistrust of false and misleading communications from public institutions is a fundamental tool of caution and self-defence for citizens.
Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.
