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The 'Right to Exist' of States

28 April 2026

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Italian translation of the article published in the Property and Freedom Journal

The 'Right to Exist' of States
by Alessandro Fusillo (1)
25 April 2026
Property and Freedom Journal

Italy is among the many countries that have adopted, or intend to adopt, increasingly effective legislative instruments to combat what legislators consider one of the scourges of our time: the alleged resurgence of anti-Semitism. As is usually the case, the activism of parliaments and governments corresponds to no real need on the part of citizens, who, eighty years after the fall of National Socialism and the foundation of the State of Israel in Palestine, are perfectly capable of evaluating both anti-Semitism and the Israeli state project with objectivity and detachment. All the more so given that worldwide there are no political forces whose programmes include ethnic or religious hostility towards Jews, contrary to what has historically been the case. On the contrary, parliaments and governments across the world teem with politicians who place their friendship with Israel above their duties of loyalty towards the state they represent. Consider the cases of Ted Cruz in the United States or Argentine President Milei, who misses no opportunity to boast of being the most Zionist president in the world.

That widespread antipathy towards the State of Israel might be connected to reactions against the crimes committed by Israelis in the Gaza Strip and, more generally, against the Palestinian people, appears to be an assumption that never crosses the minds of Western legislators, bent as they are on eradicating anti-Semitism. Italy intends to place itself at the forefront of this political project. A bill was recently introduced by a parliamentarian from the right-wing coalition, Senator Maurizio Gasparri. Among other things, the bill aims to amend Article 604-bis of the Italian Criminal Code, supplementing its provisions. In its current wording, Article 604-bis of the Criminal Code punishes anyone who disseminates ideas based on racial or ethnic superiority or hatred, or instigates or commits acts of discrimination. The penalty is increased if the instigation concerns the commission of violent acts or provocation to violence, and if the propaganda or instigation is based on the denial, minimisation, or condoning of the Holocaust or of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

The newly proposed text aims to extend the increased penalty (two to six years' imprisonment) where the propaganda or instigation is based on hostility, animosity, denigration, discrimination, conflict, or violence against Jews and their property, as well as on the denial of the Holocaust or of the right to exist of the State of Israel, or on its destruction.

We would thus have a curiously contradictory legal text which, on the one hand, prohibits the minimisation of crimes against humanity and war crimes—such as those undeniably committed by the State of Israel in Palestine—and, on the other, punishes incitement to hatred or discrimination based on the denial of the right to exist of the State of Israel, which is the very organisation responsible for those war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Were the bill to be passed, Italy would become the first country in the world to protect, by means of criminal penalties, the right to exist of the State of Israel, severely punishing anyone who questions that right, even if in the course of speech or actions aimed at stirring up hatred or discrimination against Jews. The bill raises an interesting legal question.

Does a right to exist actually exist for the State of Israel—or for any other State? In what sense can a state be said to hold such a right worthy of legal protection, to the extent of justifying criminal penalties against those who challenge it?

The question is by no means trivial and relates to a debate that has long engaged scholars of law and philosophy. Without claiming to be exhaustive, and outlining only the broad contours of the evolution of thought on this matter, it suffices to recall that Roman law did not recognise the personification of the state. The formula generally employed to refer to the Roman Republic and later the Roman Empire was SPQR (Senatus Populusque Romanus), that is, the sum of the two legislative assemblies. Ulpian’s very definition of public law is founded primarily on the concept of utility, of the interest concerning the affairs of the Romans as distinct from those of private individuals. Nor were collective organisations such as tax-farming partnerships (societates publicanorum) legal persons in the modern sense (2)—although they operated with considerable patrimonial autonomy and their ownership shares appear to have been transferred or assigned, as emerges from a passage in Cicero (3). Gaius (4) refers to the authorisation of collegia—associations established for religious cults, firefighting, neighbourhood watch, and other functions—through the evocative expression 'corpus habere', which has been held to foreshadow the incorporation of modern joint-stock companies (5).

Modern theory of legal personality is, however, the product and legacy of medieval canon law. Only centuries after the formulations of the canonists did the idea of an abstract, eternal, and personified entity spread from theories of the Church as the mystical body of Christ to the very different realm of nascent modern states and to the personification of the 'Crown' as the body politic of the state, distinct from the natural body of the sovereign as a natural person. Kantorowicz reconstructs the genealogy of the West's most audacious legal fiction: that the sovereign has two bodies—a 'body natural', mortal and physical, and a 'body politic', immortal and corporate. The corpus mysticum developed by Catholic theology in reference to the Church (a mystical body of which Christ is the head and the faithful the members) became 'politicised' after 1250. The polis was conceived as a perpetual organism, with the king as the head of a timeless body politic, immune to death and the statute of limitations. Through Plowden (1571) and Coke (early 17th century), Tudor jurists refined the doctrine: the king is a 'corporation sole', a legal person composed of a single individual yet endowed with perpetual continuity. Maitland sarcastically observed that this was 'metaphysical nonsense'; Kantorowicz saw in it 'a mystical fiction of theological roots, unconsciously transferred by Tudor lawyers to the myth of the state'. The concept of corporate legal personality transferred part of its religious awe to secular governments, thereby contributing to the establishment of the statist cult. The logic of a perpetual fictitious person, once formulated for the Church, was naturally extended to universitates: towns, colleges, parishes, and benefices—and ultimately to commercial companies. The legal personality of collective bodies is thus neither a natural truth nor a self-evident rational proposition, but the secularised residue of a pre-modern political and religious theology. It is a contingent cultural legacy, not a logical necessity of law (6). A system as refined as Roman law was able to dispense with legal personality for more than a thousand years.

Modern states—as personified entities, bearers of rights, subject to moral and legal rules distinct from those generally applicable to individuals—established themselves with the end of the Thirty Years' War (7).

Significantly, it was during this same period that other personified corporate bodies—commercial trading companies—entered the historical stage. Initially, governments granted corporate status by Royal Charter: the most famous example being the Bank of England, established in 1694 by virtue of the Tunnage Act, which declared its subscribers 'one Body Politick and Corporate, in Deed and in Name', endowed with 'perpetual Succession' and a common seal, with the power to hold lands, sue, and be sued. Over the subsequent century and a half, legal personality became a general privilege granted to all bodies meeting certain formal requirements, and this development reached its climax with the Limited Liability Act 1855, which definitively established, alongside personification, limited liability—thereby fully separating the assets of the incorporated entity from those of its members and directors (8).

A parallel development—intimately connected with the theme of this brief essay—is the rise of the nation-state. One of the fundamental ideas driving the nineteenth-century revolutions and wars that gave birth to many modern states was the Mazzinian conception of the nation as a community of destiny endowed with a 'mission'. According to Mazzini, the nation, understood as both a necessity and a need, is the intermediate and indispensable level between the individual and humanity: it is the instrument through which the individual enters universal history and through which humanity organises itself. There is no 'humanity' in the abstract without the mediation of the nation, nor a fully moral individual without the mediation of the nation. Therefore, every nation has the right and duty to constitute itself as an independent state. In Mazzini's vision, the state is the juridical-political instrument through which the nation fulfills its mission and participates in the life of humanity. A nation without a state is incomplete; a state without a nation (as in the case of multi-ethnic empires and dynastic realms founded upon the private property of the ruling house) is illegitimate, because it holds together by force what nature and history have kept apart. Two corollaries flow from these premises: the right to insurrection against multinational empires such as Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, or Tsarist Russia; and the republican form of the nation-state. Mazzini was also among the first thinkers to identify a supranational dimension for national states. It was not by chance that in 1834 he founded Young Europe: the idea was the creation of a federation of democratic national movements struggling together for national emancipation as a moment of human emancipation.
The right of nation-states to exist rests on an overlap between civil society—composed of ethnic, linguistic, geographical, and historical ties—and the bureaucratic and administrative structures that aspire to rule that society as territorial monopolists of violence, according to the celebrated Weberian formula, or, more precisely and astutely, as territorial monopolists of ultimate decision-making, as suggested by Hans-Hermann Hoppe (9). The idea of the right of peoples to have 'their own' nation-state proved to be an extremely powerful ideology, capable of permanently reshaping the global geopolitical order (suffice it to consider the emergence of states such as Germany or Italy, and the extraordinarily negative impact they had on the course of recent history).

The concept of a right to constitute a political community coinciding with a nation, and particularly Mazzinian thought, also exerted a profound influence on a substantial portion of the Jewish populations dispersed across a vast area comprising mainly Germany and all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (10). The Jewish people emerged from a millenary history in which they had succeeded in preserving, alongside their religious traditions, a strong ethnic, cultural, and traditional cohesion. What the 'Jewish nation' lacked, however, was a territory: Jews lived scattered across numerous countries, with the numerically most significant community represented by the Ashkenazim of Central and Eastern Europe, whose language was a German dialect—Yiddish.

Whilst for Italians, Serbs, or Hungarians the aspiration to establish their own nation-state could be realised through violent rebellion or war against the empires within which they were incorporated, for Jews the aspiration to have a 'state of their own' was tied from the outset to the problem of identifying a territory that could be used for that purpose (11). Thus Zionism was born, understood as a political, social, terrorist, and ultimately military movement aimed at realising a seemingly anachronistic and impossible project: the re-establishment of the State of Israel—no longer as a monarchy but in the guise of a modern democratic state—precisely in the lands of Palestine which, according to the biblical narrative, had been the object of the divine promise to Moses and the so-called 'chosen people'.

The right of modern Jews to a state was therefore not simply the right to rebel against an imperial institution perceived as alien to the historical mission of the 'Jewish nation' in the Mazzinian sense, but also the right to acquire a region then belonging to the Ottoman Empire and inhabited by a small Jewish minority alongside a majority of Arab populations. Unlike other instances of state formation—such as the Greek, Italian, or German cases—where the expulsion of the empire detested by the local population could be achieved through limited wars and bloodshed circumscribed in time, the Zionist project was from the outset far more arduous, since the establishment of a new nation-state in an area that had belonged to other peoples for over a millennium necessarily entailed the dispossession of the current inhabitants by inevitably violent means, given that the purchase of the desired lands was a viable solution in only a very limited number of cases.

In this context, the parallel between Italian unification and the establishment of the State of Israel is rich in insight. Whilst annexation to the Piedmontese House of Savoy proceeded with relative ease in central Italy, the case of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was very different: there, the Piedmontese conquest was experienced as an invasion and gave rise to a decade-long war of resistance—so-called brigandage. The undeniable existence of linguistic, ethnic, religious, and cultural affinities among the peoples subsequently forced into the Procrustean bed of the Kingdom of Italy ultimately helped forge—albeit imperfectly, and with sharp differences still visible a century and a half later—a kind of community in which nationality came to be identified with the bureaucratic-administrative structure of the new state. Similarly, the Israeli conquest of ever larger portions of Palestinian territory encountered fierce resistance from the peoples subjected to foreign invasion; but in this case, unlike in Southern Italy, there were insufficient commonalities to allow any kind of merger between conquerors and conquered. This explains the war that has raged in Palestine for more than eighty years, pitting two sides against each other whose aim is mutual annihilation. The construction of a new Israeli national identity thus passed not only through the customary forge of states—war—but also through the artificial construction of a new national identity, not least by overcoming the linguistic differences among Jews living in different areas of Europe through the project of reviving a dead language: Hebrew. Using a German dialect such as Yiddish would have been embarrassing following the persecution of Jews by the equally German National Socialists. In this respect as well, it is fundamentally no different from the Italian case, where modern Italian is largely an artificial language, although derived from the culturally dominant dialect, namely Tuscan.

The right of Jews to have their own state, and correspondingly the right of the State of Israel to exist as an expression of the Jewish nation, therefore poses even greater difficulties than those ordinarily encountered in any nation-building project.

Three issues must be addressed in this context. The first concerns the possible existence of a right for members of a given national community to establish, alongside their compatriots, a nation-state in the Mazzinian sense. The second concerns the possibility of a right of such a nation-state to (continue to) exist once established. The third, finally, concerns the claim of Jewish exceptionalism that would render the right to a state, and the state's right (to exist), stronger or more deserving of protection in the case of Jews than similar rights hypothetically belonging to other states. We shall see that the answer must be negative on all three counts.

States, in their capacity as territorial monopolists of ultimate decision-making, and as organisations generally characterised by compulsory membership determined by place of birth (ius soli) or descent from citizens (ius sanguinis), are entities that, at best, merely expropriate and plunder their citizens by means of taxation, and, at worst, engage in acts carrying a far heavier criminal charge—such as enslavement (military conscription), mass poisoning (the imposition of foods or pharmaceuticals harmful to health), or genocide (wars). Despite the Enlightenment rhetoric of the social contract and the voluntary participation of citizens in the political communities in which they find themselves by accident, it is evident that any element of voluntariness in subjugation to a given state is entirely absent. In this context, states—and the ruling classes at the helm of the coercive apparatus (12)—employ religious narratives (divine-right monarchies) or sociological ones (democracy and the identification of the people with the state) designed to induce their subjects to accept the organisation as legitimate, just, and inevitable. This does not alter the fact, however, that every state is in essence a violent and criminal organisation (13), and that no right to establish such an organisation can be asserted. Even if a majority of the people belonging to a given nation desire the establishment of a territorial monopoly of decision-making power and violence, this does not justify imposing their will upon an unwilling minority. The collective nature and systematic organisation of states do not eliminate their unlawful character and do not allow for the assertion of any individual right—aggregable with other similar rights—to build such an organisation. From this perspective, one cannot overstate the deleterious nature of nationalism, with particular reference to its Mazzinian variant, and of the idea of a right to belong to a political community. In this context, Mazzini's idea of a historical mission can be taken no more seriously than the religious justifications of ancient states (divine right, kings and emperors as gods or chosen by the gods, etc.). From a strictly legal standpoint, moreover, the right to a state—insofar as it involves the foundation of an organisation whose purpose will be the systematic violation of the rights of others (property, life, bodily integrity)—cannot be the object of a right. By the same token, there is no right to establish a mafia syndicate or a gang of robbers.

Companies in general, and states in particular, are the product of a legal fiction consisting of attributing to an abstract and conceptual entity the status of a person, for the purpose of assigning rights and duties to that entity (14). The fiction serves to impute to a single centre of interests rights and obligations that would otherwise have to be ascribed to a collective body that is difficult or impossible to manage. Can we, however, assert the right of legal persons to exist? Not as a right to establish a legal person—which is a right belonging to its members or founders—but as a right belonging to the entity itself, which would thus have a legitimate claim, for example, to defend itself or to resist attempts to bring about its dissolution or liquidation (15). It is evident that, from a logical standpoint, no such right can be said to exist. The right to establish—and, correspondingly, to dissolve—a (fictitious) entity can belong only to its founders and members, if and only if such a legal person commits no criminal offences, since in that case no such right exists even for its founders. And anyone has the right to voice opposition to the existence of such a fictitious entity, all the more so when, as in the case of states, the entity is an organisation that systematically and institutionally commits serious crimes. In this case, opposition to the existence of a corporate criminal entity is one of the components of the right of self-defence. States, as fictitious legal persons, may be holders of rights that it is impracticable to assign to the group of individuals represented by the state; but they do not hold a right to existence modelled on the right to life of human beings. The so-called right to life is the right not to be subjected to lethal aggression or—inverting the reasoning—the duty to refrain from using lethal force against other peaceful human beings. It does not apply in cases of self-defence aimed at repelling potentially lethal aggression. No analogous right, in the form of a right to exist, can be asserted for legal persons—and a fortiori for states. Not only, and not primarily, because states are engaged in the systematic organisation of criminal acts, but above all because fictitious entities, however much they may hold rights, are neither self-conscious nor self-owners; hence the non-existence of any right to self-defence or self-preservation, which cannot be predicated of a fictitious entity such as a state.

For this reason, the use of characteristically human categories and concepts in the case of states is certainly misleading and tends to generate confusion. Thus, the right of self-defence of states in the event of external aggression (by another state) is the application to a fictitious subject of a concept born and conceived for self-conscious human beings, capable of reason and therefore holders of rights. States and corporations are in reality linguistic constructs aimed at the simpler management of bundles of rights and obligations attributable to a plurality of individuals. What must be avoided, however, is the hypostatisation and anthropomorphisation of a legal fiction to the point of attributing to that fiction rights that can belong only to human beings. It is one thing to attribute property to a fictitious subject whose purpose is to enable the more efficient management of an asset held by a group of people; it is quite another to transfer to that fiction rights that, by definition, cannot belong to it.

Having excluded, therefore, the possibility that individuals possess a right to establish and maintain a state, and having likewise excluded the possibility that the state itself, as a legal fiction, can have a right to defend itself and continue to exist, there remains to be assessed the legitimacy of an alleged privileged position of the State of Israel regarding its existence.

States are transitory entities whose geographical boundaries and bureaucratic-administrative structures have historically undergone sweeping changes. Few states have survived, in their geographical extent and political structure, for more than a few centuries. The claim to the inviolability of borders and to perpetuity is thus an illusion nurtured by the prevailing narrative of the moment. This applies to the State of Israel as it does to any other state organisation. Furthermore, the Jews themselves are practical and concrete proof of how an ethnic-religious culture and tradition can be preserved even in the absence of a territory and a government. Nation is not equivalent to state. The religious argument that would assert a right of Jews to repossess the biblical Promised Land is particularly weak and tends to postulate an illegitimate legal rule, because it fails the universalisation test that is the fundamental juridical trait of a valid rule. According to that narrative, Jews enjoy a privileged right to control a specific area of the Middle East because they are the 'chosen people', presumably by God. Leaving aside the impossibility of rational proof for such a claim, it is a religious belief grounded in discrimination, and represents a direct denial of the foundation of any universally valid legal order, namely the non-aggression principle. Repossessing ancestral lands believed to have been gifted to the forefathers by an invisible deity entails aggression against other peaceful human beings whose only fault is not sharing religious beliefs regarding divine promises allegedly made thousands of years ago. The (re)appropriation of Palestinian lands by the State of Israel therefore constitutes a direct violation of the property rights of those who inhabited those lands prior to the founding of the modern State of Israel (16).

It is worth recalling that such an origin in institutionalised robbery is a trait shared by many modern states and is in no way unique to Israel. One need only consider the appropriation by the Kingdom of Italy of church properties and the assets of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, or the appropriation by the United States of Native American lands and the subsequent slaughter of their inhabitants. The origin of all states in violence and coercion is a well-documented historical fact common to virtually every state organisation in the world. Equally fallacious and unfounded is the argument that would confer upon Jews a privileged and stronger right to have a state of their own by reason of the persecutions suffered throughout history, and in particular at the hands of National Socialist Germany. This is a mechanism of historical compensation devoid of logic: not only are the beneficiaries of reparations for past wrongs not the same persons who suffered the persecutions, but in many cases the current inhabitants of the State of Israel are unable to document any descent from the victims of those persecutions.

Even less convincing is the argument advanced by Walter Block, according to which the inhabitants of the modern State of Israel are the heirs of the Israelites expelled from Judea by the Romans in 70 AD and forced into the diaspora (17). The archaeological evidence is inconclusive; the property rights plundered by the Roman Empire have long since lapsed under the statute of limitations; and the claim to restore a state of affairs existing nearly two thousand years ago opens up scenarios of historical-archaeological revanchism that risk plunging the entire world into chaos. Italians could, with equal justification, demand the restoration of the Roman Empire and claim privileged dominion over a vast area stretching from Scotland to the Caucasus. The descendants of the Celts could claim France, Spain, and England for themselves—countries from which they were expelled by the military power of the Roman Republic. Native Americans could demand the expulsion from North America of the populations that colonised it over the centuries. The claim to restore borders and state structures as they existed in history would transform the world into a hotbed of conflicts destined to violate directly private property rights that are well-established and no longer seriously contestable, given the impossibility of proving one's status as the heir of a member of a people unjustly expelled from their lands and of identifying the present owners of those same lands as descendants of the ancient robbers. Finally, the State of Israel itself is founded upon the denial of private property. Not only is almost the entire geographical expanse of Israel state property and leased out only to Jews (to the exclusion of Palestinians, who are not even entitled to receive, under state lease, the very lands from which they were expelled); but, contrary to Block's claim that Israel is a liberal state respectful of property rights and the Lockean idea of homesteading, the Israeli political organisation rejects in principle—and by express constitutional provision—the recognition of private property within its territory, with the exception of urban properties.

To this must be added the crimes and acts of violence systematically committed against the Palestinians throughout the history of the State of Israel—violence and abuses that, not without reason, have been described as outright genocide (18).

The concerns raised by any 'right to exist' of the State of Israel appear all the more pressing when one considers that the Israeli political project, in reality, has never confined itself to its existing territorial boundaries. On the contrary, running through modern Zionism—from Jabotinsky's Revisionist wing and the Irgun's claim to both banks of the Jordan, through the 1967 Movement for Greater Israel, to the religious-Zionist settler movement and its contemporary heirs—is a recurring ideology of territorial expansion commonly termed Greater Israel (Eretz Yisrael ha-Shlema) (19). The extent of this putative 'Whole Land' has varied depending on the speaker and the context—from Herzl's early diary entry regarding an area 'from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates', to today's more operational ambition encompassing the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and buffer zones in southern Lebanon and Syria—yet the underlying logic has remained constant: the progressive creation, through settlements, demographic engineering, and military occupation, of faits accomplis designed to render any territorial withdrawal irreversible (20). A related strand of strategic thinking, exemplified by Oded Yinon's 1982 essay 'A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s', advocates not outright annexation but the systematic fragmentation of surrounding Arab states into smaller ethno-sectarian units incapable of posing any strategic challenge—a logic that the broader trajectory of Middle Eastern geopolitics over the past forty years has, intentionally or otherwise, strikingly mirrored (21). None of this belongs any longer to the realm of fringe extremist discourse: in recent years, senior members of the Israeli government—including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who in a 2024 documentary openly declared that 'the future of Jerusalem is to expand to Damascus', and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who in August 2025 publicly stated that he was 'very' attached to the vision of Greater Israel and saw himself as on a 'historical and spiritual mission'—have explicitly endorsed such ambitions, drawing joint condemnations from over thirty Arab and Muslim states and from the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices (22). Whatever view one may take regarding the actual existence of a coherent 'plan' underpinning these stances, the documentary record is sufficient to conclude that no 'right to exist' can sensibly be asserted in favour of a state organisation whose ruling elite openly proclaims its intention to expand beyond any recognised borders—and least of all through the machinery of criminal law.

All of this leads us to conclude, a fortiori, that the State of Israel cannot possess a right to exist. It is a violent and coercive organisation founded on the denial of the non-aggression principle—in which it demonstrates itself to be particularly efficient and ruthless. The wish that it might cease to exist—a wish applicable to all states, from Italy to the United States of America, Argentina, and Germany—far from being an opinion worthy of sanction, should rather be a hope for the world (23).

Notes
(1) Alessandro Fusillo is a libertarian lawyer based in Italy, Spain, and Germany.
(2) Ulpian, D. 1, 1, 1, 2: 'Publicum ius est quod ad statum rei romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem'; on societates publicanorum, see William N. Goetzmann and Geert Rouwenhorst (eds), The Origins of Value; Ulrike Malmendier, 'Roman Shares', p. 31 ff., argues that societates publicanorum prefigured the structure of modern limited liability companies with freely transferable shares.
(3) Cicero, In Vatinium, 29, English translation available online: https://www.attalus.org/cicero/vatinius.html.
(4) Gaius, 3 ad ed. prov., D. 3.4.1.
(5) Paolo Garbarino, 'I collegia nella storia costituzionale romana', Teoria e Storia del Diritto Privato, XVI (2023); see also the passages cited therein from Castrenze Minasola, I 'collegia' nell'antica Roma. Sulle tracce di quella libertà associativa 'quae pactionem atque coniurationem adversus rem publicam fecit' (Rome: Aracne, 2021).
(6) Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); F. W. Maitland, 'The Crown as Corporation', in Collected Papers, vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911); Otto von Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, 4 vols (1868–1913); Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: L'Eucharistie et l'Église au Moyen Âge (Paris: Aubier, 1944).
(7) For a critique of the traditional thesis that the sovereign state was born out of the Peace of Westphalia, see Derek Croxton, 'The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty', The International History Review 21, no. 3 (1999): 569–591.
(8) On corporate legal personality and limited liability, with further references, see Stephan Kinsella, 'Corporate Personhood, Limited Liability, and Double Taxation'; J. Lawrence Broz and Richard S. Grossman, 'Paying for Privilege: The Political Economy of Bank of England Charters, 1694–1844', Explorations in Economic History 41 (2004): 48–72; Charles Goodhart, 'The Bank of England, 1694–2017', LSE Working Paper, 2017; John Francis, History of the Bank of England, its Times and Traditions, 2 vols (1847); Margaret M. Blair, 'Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona', University of Illinois Law Review (2013): 785–820; Evelyn Atkinson, American Frankenstein: Creating the Corporate Constitutional Person, doctoral thesis, University of Chicago, 2023.
(9) Max Weber, Politik als Beruf (1919); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, 'Government, Money, and International Politics', Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 2 (2003). On the idea that the strengthening of the state entails the weakening of civil society, see Albert J. Nock, Our Enemy, the State (1935).
(10) Moses Hess, Rome and Jerusalem: A Study in Jewish Nationalism (New York: Bloch, 1918), cited in Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 52, with direct reference to Mazzini's idea of a 'Third Rome'.
(11) Theodor Herzl, Der Judenstaat (1896).
(12) Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York, 1939).
(13) Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (New York, 2003); idem, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169 ff.
(14) Francesco Belvisi, 'Alle origini dell'idea di istituzione: il concetto di "collegium" come "persona ficta" in Sinibaldo dei Fieschi', Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica XXIII, no. 1 (1993): 3–23.
(15) The legislative and judicial trajectory has in fact moved in precisely the opposite direction to that argued here, through the progressive recognition of legal persons as holders of constitutional rights originally conceived for natural persons. See Evelyn Atkinson, American Frankenstein: Creating the Corporate Constitutional Person (Chicago, 2021).
(16) Saifedean Ammous, 'Property Rights: The Root Cause of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict', Saifedean Substack (10 Nov. 2025; Bitcoin Standard podcast; youtube), based on PFP309 | Saifedean Ammous: Property Rights: The Root Cause of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (PFS 2025). See also idem, 'Property Rights: The Root Cause of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict', Notes in the Margin, Mises Wire (16 Dec. 2025).
(17) Walter E. Block and Alan G. Futerman, The Classical Liberal Case for Israel (Singapore: Springer, 2021), with a preface by Benjamin Netanyahu. The authors' defence of Israel rests explicitly on a Lockean theory of homesteading and private property rights and contains, in chapter 6, an explicit critique of Murray Rothbard's anti-Zionist position (Murray N. Rothbard, 'War Guilt in the Middle East', Left and Right 3, no. 3 (Spring–Autumn 1967): 20–30, republished in Libertarian Institute (9 Oct. 2023)). For a systematic critique of Block and Futerman's argument from a libertarian perspective, see Saifedean Ammous's response to Walter Block on the Israeli-Palestinian question (Ammous–Block debate, October 2023), partially reproduced in Stephan Kinsella, 'Ammous vs. Block on Israel', StephanKinsella.com (29 Jan. 2024).
(18) See, regarding the ongoing genocide in Gaza, the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Orders of 26 January 2024, 28 March 2024, and 24 May 2024; as well as the Advisory Opinion Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (summary page), rendered on 19 July 2024, addressing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination as an erga omnes obligation.
(19) On the ideological trajectory from Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionism (and the Irgun's claim to both banks of the Jordan) to the post-1967 Movement for Greater Israel (HaTenu'a Lema'an Eretz Yisrael HaSheleima), see Colin Shindler, The Triumph of Military Zionism: Nationalism and the Origins of the Israeli Right (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Eran Kaplan, The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and Its Ideological Legacy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005). The September 1967 manifesto 'Le-ma'an Eretz Yisrael ha-Shlema', signed among others by Natan Alterman, S. Y. Agnon, and Moshe Tabenkin, appeared in major Israeli daily newspapers on 22 September 1967.
(20) On the settlement project as a deliberate instrument of territorial irreversibility, see Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967–1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006); Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967–2007 (New York: Nation Books, 2007); Ian Lustick, For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988); Nur Masalha, Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion (London: Pluto, 2000).
(21) Oded Yinon, 'A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties', Kivunim 14 (February 1982), English translation by Israel Shahak, Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1982. On the continuity between Yinon's strategic plan and the actual trajectory of Middle Eastern fragmentation over the past forty years—irrespective of whether a unified 'plan' ever existed—see Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, updated ed. (New York: Norton, 2014); Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's National Security and Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006); and, from a Palestinian perspective, Rashid Khalidi, The Hundred Years' War on Palestine (New York: Metropolitan, 2020). The cautionary reading against conspiracy-minded uses of Yinon is articulated, among others, by Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy (New York: St. Martin's, 1996).
(22) Bezalel Smotrich, speech in Paris, 19 March 2023, delivered behind a podium displaying a map of 'Greater Israel' encompassing the entirety of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; Smotrich, interview for the Arte documentary, October 2024, declaring that 'the future of Jerusalem is to expand to Damascus'; Benjamin Netanyahu, interview with i24NEWS, August 2025, stating that he is 'very' attached to the vision of Greater Israel and considers himself on a 'historical and spiritual mission'. Knesset resolution of July 2025 declaring the West Bank 'an inseparable part of the Land of Israel'. For an overview of these recent developments within a broader historiographical framework, see the Report of the Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices, United Nations General Assembly, session A/80/PV, 2025, focusing explicitly on the 'Greater Israel project', and the joint condemnation issued in August 2025 by thirty-one Arab and Muslim states, the League of Arab States, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
(23) On the distinction between nation and state, and on the corresponding right of voluntary secession—from which it follows that no state, as such, possesses any right to exist against the will of those over whom it asserts jurisdiction—see Murray N. Rothbard, 'Nations by Consent: Deconstructing the Nation-State', J. Libertarian Stud. 11, no. 1 (Autumn 1994): 1–10; Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism: In the Classical Tradition, Ralph Raico, trans., 3rd ed. (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1985), especially ch. 3 § 1 on the right of self-determination down to the individual level; and more recently Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy: The God That Failed (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), ch. 6 on secession and decentralisation.
On the model of the state as a 'stationary bandit' and on its implications regarding the non-existence of any 'right' of the state to exist as such, see Mancur Olson, 'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development', American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–576; and idem, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (New York: Basic Books, 2000). For a broader sociological-historical treatment of the state as the institutional outcome of organised violence, see Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998), especially chs 22–24 on the illegitimacy of the state; idem, Anatomy of the State (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2009), also included in idem, Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays, R.A. Childs, Jr. (ed.), 2nd ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2000), originally published in Rampart Journal of Individualist Thought, vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1965): 1–24; Anthony de Jasay, The State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985; repr. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998); Franz Oppenheimer, The State: Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically (New York: Vanguard, 1926).