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The Nominalistic Principle and Fiat Money: Law as a Crutch for Monetary Fraud

19 May 2026

ArticoliAltri post

Alessandro Fusillo
8 May 2026
Translation of the article published in the Property and Freedom Journal (https://propertyandfreedom.org/journal/the-nominalistic-principle-and-fiat-money/)

In the matter of pecuniary obligations, the prevailing doctrine in civil law adheres to the principle of nominalism. In essence, the principle provides that—beyond the mechanisms protecting the creditor against the loss of the purchasing power of money (agreed interest rates, inflation indexation clauses, etc.)—the discharge of an obligation follows the Roman law principle of tantundem eiusdem generis: the obligation to pay 1,000 dollars on a specified date is satisfied, and the debtor accordingly extinguishes it, by paying the agreed amount on the agreed date, irrespective of whether, in the meantime, the value (purchasing power) of the sum in question may have been eroded and no longer corresponds to its original value.
Legal doctrine generally adheres—rather uncritically—to the state-chartalist theory of money, well represented by the writings of Knapp, Mann, and Ascarelli.(2) From this perspective, what confers the character of money upon a given thing (metal, pieces of paper printed with coloured designs, or anything else) is the command of the State. Money is such because there is a law that defines it as legal tender. The source of the monetary nature of a thing is therefore the legislative power of the State as the ultimate decision-maker. And this, in turn, also finds expression in monetary sovereignty.
The 1924 English translation of Knapp's work was the conduit through which the German author entered the Anglo-Saxon world. It is significant that this translation was vigorously promoted by John Maynard Keynes, who had read the German original as early as the 1910s and considered Knapp one of his intellectual mentors on monetary matters, so much so that he cited him explicitly in his Treatise on Money (1930) as the founder of chartalism.(3) The first chapter of Keynes's Treatise opens, not coincidentally, with the statement: «Money of account […] is the primary concept of a theory of money» («Money of account […] is the primary concept of a theory of money.»), which is a direct conceptual translation of Knapp's thesis. The common thread running from Knapp, through Keynes, to the Modern Monetary Theory of Wray, Mosler, and Kelton is precisely this, and it spans the entire twentieth century.
Keynes proclaims, in an all-encompassing formulation that has exerted enormous influence over all post-Keynesian monetary theory and contemporary Modern Monetary Theory: «the State, therefore, comes in first of all as the authority of law which enforces the payment of the thing which corresponds to the name or description in the contract. But it comes in doubly when, in addition, it claims the right to determine and declare what thing corresponds to the name, and to vary its declaration from time to time—when, that is to say, it claims the right to re-edit the dictionary. This right is claimed by all modern States and has been claimed for at least four thousand years. It is when this stage in the evolution of money has been reached that Knapp's Chartalism—the doctrine that money is peculiarly a creation of the State—is fully realised. [...] Today all civilised money is, beyond the possibility of dispute, chartalist.»(4)
The theory of the State as creator of money has nineteenth-century roots in the German Historical School (Knapp was a student of the Jüngere historische Schule: Wagner, Schmoller, Bücher), and in a sense is an offshoot of the late 1880s Methodenstreit. The clash between Menger and Schmoller in 1883–1884 over the method of the social sciences was in fact also a clash between a catallactic theory of money—according to Menger, money arises spontaneously from exchange and precedes the law—and a historical-institutional theory of money—Schmoller, and subsequently Knapp: money derives from authority, emerging after the State. When Mises wrote his Theorie des Geldes in 1912 against Knapp—one of the work's most important controversies, conducted in Chapter IV, Section 3 and in Appendix A, Section 2—he was not merely engaging in a theoretical dispute: he was continuing Menger's Methodenstreit on new ground.(5)
The nominalistic principle is, for instance, enshrined in Article 1277 of the Italian Civil Code, which provides for the discharge of pecuniary obligations at the nominal value of the obligation contracted, and refers to the value of the debt only where the currency used to denominate the original obligation is no longer legal tender.
The legal treatment of the subject according to nominalist theory prevents jurists from recognising the market phenomenon that money represents and, above all, from taking into account the systematic manipulation of the purchasing power of money by fiat money systems, wherein the central bank, through its control over the issuance of the monetary base and over interest rates, is able to influence the quantity of money in circulation and, consequently, its value or purchasing power, and thus the substance of contracts that specify a price expressed in monetary terms.
Yet, at least in Italian civil law doctrine, there is widespread awareness of the fact that the nominalistic principle, under a regime of perpetual inflation, entails a systematic transfer of wealth from creditor to debtor.(6)
Civil law jurists, however, while acknowledging the problem, approach it within the chartalist horizon and ultimately regard monetary depreciation not from the perspective of manipulation, but exclusively from that of risk mitigation. The loss of the purchasing power of money is taken as a given external to the law, from which one must start—without subjecting it to critical scrutiny—in order to devise legal solutions that account for the unequal distribution of risk between creditor and debtor that nominalism entails.
The treatment offered by civil lawyers does not address at all the connected problem of payments on government debt securities, which from a civil law perspective are nothing more than bonds, albeit with the State as debtor.
The most recent and direct reference is that of a Brazilian-American legal scholar, Bruno Meyerhof Salama.(7) Salama argues that legal nominalism is a risk-allocation mechanism that assigns the cost of monetary depreciation to the creditor, thereby allowing the debtor (in particular the issuing State) to "shift its burden" onto creditors by eroding the real value of the obligation without formally breaching the terms of payment. The phrase used is suggestive: stealth default (hidden insolvency). According to Salama, «the legal system allows debtors to shift their burden onto creditors through structures that, while formally complying with the contract, erode its real value».
Levontin, in a monograph devoted to the nominalistic principle,(8) identifies nominalism as an instrument of state monetary policy—not as a neutral rule of private law. Levontin documents that nominalism historically established itself precisely because the State, an endemic debtor to its own subjects, had an interest in being able to repay in debased currency the loans received in sound money. Its origin, according to Levontin, is therefore the State's prerogative to control money.
Chartalist and nominalist principles have a significant impact on the question of contract. Starting from a libertarian and "Austrian" perspective, according to the title-transfer theory of contract (TTToC),(9) contract, in a legal-economic sense, is not a legally binding promise (as the mainstream Anglo-American promise theory would have it), but rather a transfer of title to a scarce good. The contract therefore finds its substance in the transfer of ownership, not in the obligation to keep one's word.
Therefore:
(a) If a monetary contract is—as the TTToC contends—a transfer of title to a determinate quantity of a specific scarce resource (money), and
(b) if the subject matter of the contract is therefore a title of ownership over real resources mediated by the monetary unit, then
(c) the quantitative manipulation of money by a third party (the State issuing fiat money or the central bank expanding it) or by one of the parties (the State as issuer of government debt securities denominated in its own currency) empties the transfer of title of its substance: what the creditor will receive is no longer the quantity of real resources over which title was transferred, but rather a nominally identical and substantially depleted quantity, since the monetary unit has been diluted.
(d) If one adds to this that—according to chartalist doctrine (Knapp, Keynes)—the State arrogates to itself the legal right to redefine unilaterally what constitutes money («the right to rewrite the dictionary», Keynes 1930), then the modern fiat State performs the contradictory dual function of guarantor of contracts and manipulator of their substantive content.
This is a structural, not an accidental, contradiction of the contemporary legal system: the State that is supposed to guarantee the substance of transfers of property title is precisely the agent that erodes their content through the manipulation of the medium conveying them. In the same way, the State that presents itself as the guarantor of fundamental rights (life, liberty, and property) is the foremost and principal violator of those very rights.
Now, if a monetary contract is a transfer of title to a determinate quantity of a specific scarce resource (money), and if this resource is subject to quantitative manipulation by the sovereign issuer, then the monetary contract is structurally incomplete in its very nature: the subject matter of the transfer is subject to unilateral post-contractual definition by a third party (the State) that is also the guarantor of the contract itself.
In even more precise terms: a debt of one thousand euros contracted in 2010 is a transfer of title to a monetary unit (the euro of 2010) which, according to the chartalist doctrine accepted by the legal system, is the same thing as the monetary unit (the euro of 2026) with which the debt is discharged. But this nominal identity is not substantive identity: the purchasing power of the 2026 euro is a fraction of that of the 2010 euro. The title-transfer theory of contract makes it possible to see clearly what the nominalistic principle conceals: that the State, through its chartalist monopoly over the definition of money, is authorising an asymmetric transfer of title wherein what the creditor receives does not correspond to the title originally transferred.
The title-transfer theory of contract is therefore incompatible with chartalism, because chartalism postulates that the State has the right to redefine the subject matter of the contract, whereas the TTToC postulates that the subject matter of the contract is a determinate and immutable title to a scarce resource. Chartalism hollows out the TTToC; or, conversely, the TTToC is the legal refutation of chartalism.
In the case of government debt securities, the problem is even more radical. When the State issues a government debt security denominated in its own currency, it is simultaneously a contracting party (debtor) and the legal authority defining the subject matter of the contract (the sovereign issuer of the currency in which the debt is expressed). This constitutes a situation of self-dealing or structural conflict of interest: the debtor State can unilaterally reduce its debt burden by redefining the subject matter of the contract, that is, by inflating its currency. A formal default is not required: inflation is sufficient.
The diagnosis is not confined to the State and its central bank. The very same nominalist-chartalist legal framework that sanctions the public "monetary fraud" also underpins, downstream, the entire pyramid of fiduciary media—unbacked banknotes and demand deposits—issued by private banks under a fractional-reserve regime. The point was already implicit in the Roman law distinction, painstakingly reconstructed by Huerta de Soto, between depositum regulare (a deposit for safekeeping of a specific thing, where ownership is retained by the depositor and the bailee is bound to keep custody with a 100% reserve) and depositum irregulare or mutuum (a loan of fungibles, where ownership passes to the borrower against an obligation of future restitution of tantundem eiusdem generis).(10) The deliberate conflation of these two contracts—that is, the legal treatment of demand deposits as though they were loans, and the issuance of redeemable money substitutes in excess of the base money actually held—is precisely the operation that the TTToC dismantles as impossible.
The Italian Civil Code offers an interesting perspective on fractional-reserve banking: Article 1834 expressly provides that: «In deposits of a sum of money with a bank, the bank acquires ownership thereof and is obliged to return it in the same currency specie, upon expiry of the agreed term or at the request of the depositor, subject to the period of notice agreed by the parties or by customary practice.» Curiously, this statutory provision has not attracted the attention of Italian legal scholars. The only author who critically evaluated the problem of the irregular deposit is Pasquale Coppa-Zuccari, Il deposito irregolare, Modena 1901 and La natura giuridica del deposito irregolare, Modena 1902, cited by Jesús Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles cit., pp. 7, 8, 16, 28, 68, 140, 144; Coppa-Zuccari points out that the obligation to return the deposited money obliges the bank to maintain a 100% reserve and therefore to safeguard the deposited sums.
As Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block state, «two individuals cannot be the exclusive owner of one and the same thing at the same time»: the issuance of a fiduciary banknote is, objectively, the contractual creation of two incompatible property titles to the same existing quantity of base money, namely a «propertyless title in search of property».(11) The defence of free banking (Selgin, White, Horwitz)—which asserts that a claim redeemable on demand can lawfully serve as a money substitute, and that the elasticity thus produced «solves» a market failure characterised by price stickiness—rests precisely on the category mistake that this article identifies in chartalism: the confusion between a legal claim and the economic good claimed, and therefore the treatment of a promise to pay money as substantive equivalent to money itself. Just as the chartalist State "rewrites the dictionary" of money to dilute the substance of public debt, the nominalist civil-law regime "rewrites" the boundary between regular and irregular deposits to authorise a parallel dilution in the private sphere; in both cases, the law functions as a crutch for an asymmetric title transfer that the logic of the title-transfer theory of contract, taken on its own, would refuse to recognise as a contract.(12)
Ironically, the defence of fractional reserves mounted by free-banking proponents—who claim it can resolve the problem of the lack of elasticity in the money supply—echoes the equally fallacious argument advanced by proponents of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) that state intervention in money creation is necessary to mobilise «idle resources».(13) In one case—the free bankers—fiat money is described as a market response to the problem of the alleged lack of elasticity in the money supply; in the other—the MMT adherents—the creation of money out of thin air aims to rescue idle resources from their state of inactivity.(14) In either case, monetary intervention directly affects property rights and is therefore in contradiction with the TTToC.
Against this backdrop, the Austrian critique of the fiat system is no rearguard metallist battle, but reveals itself to be a radically libertarian position in the philosophy of contract: the defence of the substantive integrity of property title transfer against its chartalist erosion. Bitcoin, whose supply is mathematically immutable in its limit, and gold or silver, whose supply is physically immutable in its scarcity, possess this specific virtue: their legal-contractual status is consistent with their ontological structure, since no third party can unilaterally redefine the subject matter of the title transfer concerning them. An unmanipulable currency is the condition of possibility for a pecuniary contract properly so called; and it is—conversely—the medium that restores the integrity of the title-transfer theory of contract in the contemporary monetary world.

Notes
(2) F. A. Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1st ed. 1938 (now Ch. Proctor, Mann and Proctor on the Legal Aspect of Money, Oxford University Press, 8th ed. 2022), which devotes the chapter Monetary Obligations, Liquidated Sums, and the Principle of Nominalism to the historical reconstruction of the principle; Georg Friedrich Knapp, Staatliche Theorie des Geldes, Duncker & Humblot, Munich-Leipzig, 1st ed. 1905, 4th expanded ed. 1923, ch. I, opening: «Das Geld ist ein Geschöpf der Rechtsordnung» («money is a creature of the legal order»), and shortly thereafter: «Eine Theorie des Geldes kann daher nur rechtsgeschichtlich sein» («a theory of money can therefore only be legal-historical»); abridged English translation by H. M. Lucas and J. Bonar, The State Theory of Money, Macmillan, London 1924, published on the initiative of the Royal Economic Society with the personal support of J. M. Keynes.
(3) J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money, vol. I, The Pure Theory of Money, Macmillan, London 1930, p. 3; Geoffrey Ingham, In Defence of the Nominalist Ontology of Money, in «Journal of Post Keynesian Economics», vol. 44, no. 3, 2021, p. 492.
(4) Keynes, op. loc. cit. pp. 4 et seq.; Stephanie Bell, The Hierarchy of Money, Levy Economics Institute Working Paper no. 231, 1998, pp. 6-7; Dirk Ehnts, Knapp's «State Theory of Money» and its Reception in German Academic Discourse, IPE Working Paper 115/2019, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy, 2019.
(5) L. von Mises, Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel, Duncker & Humblot, Munich-Leipzig 1912, Part Two, chs. VI and VII; English version The Theory of Money and Credit (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute 2009 ).
(6) Cesare Massimo Bianca, Diritto civile, vol. IV, L'obbligazione, Giuffrè, Milan 1990, and subsequent editions: treatment of the nominalistic principle in ch. III. Bianca expressly acknowledges that the nominalistic principle «places the risk of monetary depreciation on the creditor»; Adolfo Di Majo, Le obbligazioni pecuniarie, Giappichelli, Turin 1996: explicit treatment of the problem of the erosion of purchasing power as an effect of nominalism; Bruno Inzitari, Profili del diritto delle obbligazioni, Cedam, Padua 2000, and Delle obbligazioni pecuniarie. Artt. 1277-1284, in Commentario Scialoja-Branca, Zanichelli, Bologna-Rome 2011: Inzitari is, of all authors, the Italian writer who most consciously discusses the relationship between the nominalistic principle and devaluation, clearly noting that the principle constitutes «a systematic risk for the creditor in the presence of perpetual inflation»; Tommaso Dalla Massara, Obbligazioni pecuniarie. Struttura e disciplina dei debiti di valuta, Cedam, Padua 2012; Mario Trimarchi, Svalutazione monetaria e ritardo nell'adempimento di obbligazioni pecuniarie, Giuffrè, Milan 1983: a monograph entirely devoted to this theme, documenting how Italian doctrine and case law between the 1970s and 1980s—under the pressure of double-digit inflation—developed a complex system of corrective measures (automatic revaluation of value debts, Art. 1224(2), ISTAT clauses, sliding scale) to curb the perverse effects of nominalism.
(7) Bruno Meyerhof Salama, America's Implicit Defaults, in «Law & Liberty», May 2025.
(8) Avner H. Levontin, The Nominalistic Principle. A Legal Approach to Inflation, Deflation, Devaluation and Revaluation, Mishpatim, Jerusalem 1971.
(9) Murray N. Rothbard, Justice and Property Rights, in S. L. Blumenfeld (ed.), Property in a Humane Economy, Open Court, La Salle (Ill.) 1974, pp. 101-122, reprinted in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays, Libertarian Review Press, Washington 1974, and in Economic Controversies (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, Edward Elgar, 2011); idem, The Ethics of Liberty, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands (NJ) 1982; New York University Press ed., New York 1998 (with preface by Hans-Hermann Hoppe), ch. XIX, Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts, pp. 133-148. Italian trans. L'etica della libertà, Italian edition edited by Luigi Marco Bassani, Liberilibri, Macerata 1996, and subsequent editions; Williamson M. Evers, Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Contracts, in «Journal of Libertarian Studies», vol. 1, no. 1, 1977, pp. 3-13; Stephan Kinsella, "Justice and Property Rights: Rothbard on Scarcity, Property, Contracts…", StephanKinsella.com (19 November 2010); idem, "A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability", in Legal Foundations of a Free Society, Papinian Press, Houston 2023, ch. IX; idem, "The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract", in D. Howden (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Misesian Austrian Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, London-New York (forthcoming 2026).
(10) Jesús Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles, trans. Melinda A. Stroup, 4th ed., Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn (Ala.) 2020, chs. 1-2, on the clear distinction in Roman and medieval civil law between depositum regulare (in which the depositary has only custody and the depositor retains ownership and the right to immediate return) and mutuum or depositum irregulare (in which ownership of the fungible passes to the borrower against an obligation to return tantundem eiusdem generis on a specified future date), and on the historical treatment of any conflation of the two as fraudulent. The point is that the tantundem eiusdem generis rule which today, under nominalism, governs the discharge of pecuniary obligations (and to which Art. 1277 of the Italian Civil Code refers) is the very same rule that classically distinguished the mutuum from the regular deposit—a distinction that fractional-reserve banking systematically overlooks.
(11) Hans-Hermann Hoppe, "How is Fiat Money Possible?—or, The Devolution of Money and Credit", The Review of Austrian Economics vol. 7, no. 2, 1994, pp. 49-74 (reprinted as ch. 6 of H.-H. Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, 2nd ed., Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn (Ala.) 2006); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, with Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Walter Block, "Against Fiduciary Media", The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics vol. 1, no. 1, 1998, pp. 19-50 (reprinted as ch. 7 of the same volume). Hoppe formulates the principle that «two individuals cannot be the exclusive owner of one and the same thing at the same time» (Hoppe 1994, p. 67); Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block develop this expressly against the title-transfer theory of contract, noting that fiduciary media are «propertyless titles in search of property» and that «the issue and acceptance of a fiduciary note … is the contractual creation of additional titles and claims to the same existing quantity of property» (Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block 1998, pp. 21-23). For collateral references, see also Murray N. Rothbard, The Mystery of Banking, Richardson & Snyder, New York 1983, and The Case for a 100 Percent Gold Dollar, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn (Ala.) 1991.
(12) For the contrary free-banking position, see Lawrence H. White, Competition and Currency, New York University Press, New York 1989, and George A. Selgin, The Theory of Free Banking. Money Supply under Competitive Note Issue, Rowman & Littlefield, Totowa (NJ) 1988, who defend fractional reserves on the premise that an «option clause» attached to redeemable notes brings the practice under the principle of freedom of contract, and that the issuance of fiduciary media is beneficial in that it meets increases in money demand that would otherwise produce «short-run monetary disequilibrium». Both arguments are answered in Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block, Against Fiduciary Media, cit., pp. 27-34 (on freedom of contract: a contract purporting to create two simultaneous titles to an existing thing is not a legitimate exercise of the principle, but a negation of its premise, since «the range of possible (valid) contracts is limited and constrained by the existing quantity (stock) of property and the nature of things, and not vice versa») and pp. 41-46 (on monetary disequilibrium: an increase in money demand is satisfied immediately and without any need for «accommodation», via a fall in money prices and a corresponding increase in the purchasing power of the existing stock of money; the issuance of fiduciary credit in response to such demand merely falsifies the social rate of time preference and initiates an Austrian boom-bust cycle). For an overview of the contemporary debate, see Stephan Kinsella, "The Great Fractional Reserve/Free-banking Debate", StephanKinsella.com (29 January 2016). On the automatic adjustment of money demand, see Detlev Schlichter, Paper money collapse: the folly of elastic money, 2014, p. 40.
(13) Stephanie Kelton, The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People's Economy, PublicAffairs, New York 2020—especially ch. 2 ("Think of Inflation"); L. Randall Wray, Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary Systems, 2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2015; Warren Mosler, Soft Currency Economics II, US Virgin Islands 2012 (1st ed. 1996); William Mitchell, L. Randall Wray, and Martin Watts, Macroeconomics, Red Globe Press / Macmillan, London 2019; Pavlina R. Tcherneva, The Case for a Job Guarantee, Polity Press, Cambridge 2020; Abba P. Lerner, Functional Finance and the Federal Debt, in «Social Research», vol. 10, no. 1, 1943, pp. 38-51. The idea of putting idle resources to work originates with Keynes himself: J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, London 1936, Book III, ch. 10, sec. VI, p. 129. Austrian and mainstream rejoinders: Robert P. Murphy, A Review of Stephanie Kelton's "The Deficit Myth", in «Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics», vol. 24, no. 1, 2021, pp. 167-198; Patrick Newman, "Modern Monetary Theory: An Austrian Interpretation of Recrudescent Keynsianism", Atl. Econ. J 48 (2020): 23-31; Thomas I. Palley, "Money, Fiscal Policy, and Interest Rates: A Critique of Modern Monetary Theory", in Review of Political Economy 27, no. 1 (2015): 1-23.
(14) The classic text on idle resources is W. H. Hutt, The Theory of Idle Resources. A Study in Definition, 2nd rev. ed. (Jonathan Cape, London 1939; Liberty Press, Indianapolis 1977)—a pioneering and extended critique of the Keynesian General Theory (1936) which denies the existence of «involuntarily idle» resources in the Keynesian sense and dismantles the doctrine that an injection of new money is necessary to mobilise them.