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Artificial Intelligence and Predictive Justice: The Negation of Da Mihi Factum, Dabo Tibi Ius and the Danger of Conflating Fact and Prediction

22 June 2026

ArticoliGeneralePostsAltri postpost in evidenza e novità

by Alessandro Fusillo

Abstract

This article analyses the philosophical, legal and theological implications of predictive justice systems based on artificial intelligence. Starting from the Misesian axiom of human action and moving through the internal debate within the Austrian School between Hayek, Hülsmann and Hoppe, a parallel is drawn with the Roman law principle da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius. The analysis integrates the Catholic conception of sin and retributive justice, the Distributist critique of the servile state (Belloc, Chesterton), the historical precedent of the English vagrancy laws, the historical parallel with Lombrosianism and algorithmic racial profiling, the question of the criminal law of intent, algorithmic opacity, and the risk of a technological thought police.

PREFACE: «DU MUSST VIEL, VIEL GENAUER WÜNSCHEN»

In Paul Maar’s celebrated children’s book series Das Sams, the protagonist is a quirky little red-headed creature with blue spots across his face. Each spot represents a wish: the Sams grants them to his adoptive father, the timid Herr Taschenbier. The mechanism is foolproof and relentless: the Sams delivers precisely what he is asked for, to the letter, devoid of interpretation or common sense. When Taschenbier wishes for a car, it appears in his living room; when he wishes to be ‘on a roof’, he finds himself on the wrong one. The Sams patiently repeats each time: «Du musst viel, viel genauer wünschen» — you must wish much, much more precisely.1
Artificial intelligence bears an extraordinary resemblance to the Sams. It is a powerful instrument, capable of fulfilling complex desires — yet it does so with the same literal fidelity and the same absence of independent judgement. Its usefulness depends entirely upon the quality of the demand: on who frames the wish, guided by which values and towards which ends. An algorithm trained to ‘reduce crime’ will realise this wish in the most efficient manner suggested by the data — and should that data reflect centuries of structural discrimination, the wish will be granted with algorithmic precision at the expense of the most vulnerable.
This article addresses one of the domains in which the algorithmic Sams risks inflicting the gravest damage: predictive criminal justice. The argument is not that artificial intelligence is inherently evil — just as the Sams is not. The argument is that whoever frames the wish determines the outcome, and that when such a wish is framed by opaque systems of power steered by central planners — whether public or private — the consequences fall upon the weakest with the precision of a machine incapable of erring, because it is incapable of "wünschen" (wishing).

1. INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF ANTICIPATORY CONVICTION
Predictive justice — namely, the use of machine learning algorithms to assess the likelihood that an individual will commit a future offence or reoffend — poses a radical challenge to the logical structure of Western legal adjudication. The Roman law principle da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius expresses that structure in axiomatic form: the judge establishes a specific fact and applies the legal rule to it. There is no judgement without a fact; there is no liability without an act.2
Predictive justice systems invert this structure fundamentally: there is no fact — there is a probability distribution; there is no individual — there is a statistical class; there is no applied legal rule — there is an algorithmic output purporting to displace human judgement. The most documented case is the COMPAS system (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions), deployed across several American states to determine bail and the length of custodial sentences.3
Such an inversion is not a remediable technical flaw: it is the logical consequence of a category mistake between fact and prediction, between actus and potentia, deeply rooted in the philosophy of action, moral theology and the history of criminal law.

2. THE AXIOM OF HUMAN ACTION: MISES AND THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF THE FUTURE
The soundest theoretical point of departure is Ludwig von Mises’s axiom of human action: every human being acts, which is to say they employ scarce means to attain chosen ends, within a context of radical uncertainty regarding the future.4 This necessarily entails the acceptance of the concepts of cost, end, means, and the pair of cause and effect.
Three implications are decisive for our argument. First: action is always future-oriented, but judgeable only ex post, on the basis of the accomplished fact. Second: the future is radically uncertain, not because knowledge is deficient, but because human action is creative — it generates novelty that cannot be deduced from the present state of the world. Third: any attempt to predict future individual action with certainty is categorically impossible, not technically improvable.5
Classical law mirrors this ontological structure: da mihi factum is not an arbitrary convention — it is the juridical translation of the structure of human action. The legal norm applies to what has occurred, not to what might occur, because only the accomplished fact is ontologically determinate.

3. THE KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM: HAYEK AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL LIMITS OF CALCULATION
Friedrich August von Hayek unfolds the second act of this critique on an epistemological plane. The failure of central planning does not stem from a lack of computational power: it stems from the very nature of human knowledge, which is dispersed, tacit and contextual.6
Knowledge relevant to action cannot be aggregated into a central system because it is embedded in practices, situated judgements and individual expectations: it manifests only in the action itself, at the very moment it is exercised. No algorithm — no matter how powerful — can capture that knowledge before it manifests.7
The parallel with predictive justice is immediate: the system claims to know what an individual will do, yet that knowledge does not yet exist — it is by definition pre-factual. Hayek would have identified in this the category mistake of rationalist constructivism: conflating the model with reality.8

4. THE RADICAL CRITIQUE: HÜLSMANN AND HOPPE ON PROPERTY AND CALCULATION
The theoretically most original contribution to our argument arises from within the Austrian School itself, from the critique directed by Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Hans-Hermann Hoppe against the Hayekian position. According to these authors, the problem of socialism — and by extension of any central planning system — is not primarily a problem of knowledge, but a problem of institutional structure: without private property there are no prices, and without prices the very data upon which calculation relies do not exist.9
Hoppe radicalises this position through an ethical lens: any system that purports to act on bases other than private property and past individual action commits a logical violation before an ethical one — it confuses what is with what might be, what the individual has done with what they might do.10
The transposition to predictive justice is compelling: the algorithm fails not merely because it lacks sufficient knowledge or does not know how to utilise it — it fails because it presupposes a framework in which a future individual fact is already treated as present data. It represents the dissolution of the ontological distinction between actus and potentia, executed under the authority of mathematical formalisation.11

5. THE THEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF IMPUTABILITY: SIN, WILL AND RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

5.1 Actus humanus and the conditions of imputability

Catholic moral theology constructs judgement upon a framework identical, mutatis mutandis, to the Roman law principle: there is no sin without actus humanus, that is, without a voluntary act performed by a free and conscious subject. Three elements constitute formal sin: grave matter (the object of the act), full awareness (knowledge), and deliberate consent (the freedom of the will).12
The Catechism is explicit in enumerating the conditions that diminish or annul imputability: ‘ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors’.13
Thomas Aquinas constructs a doctrine of retributive justice that is a proportionate response to a wrong committed, not the prevention of a statistically probable wrong. Punishment possesses meaning as a response to the fact — as the restoration of an order disturbed by a free and imputable act — not as the actuarial management of risk.14

5.2 The predictive reversal of the imputative framework

Predictive justice systematically dissolves all three constitutive elements of Catholic imputability. The deliberate act is replaced by a statistical profile; freedom at the moment of the act becomes irrelevant because ‘future freedom’ is already ‘calculated’; the proportionality of punishment to the fact gives way to the preventative management of risk.
This constitutes a pre-moral regression. The subject is judged not for what they have done as a free person, but for what they are — for their statistical nature, their membership in a class, their socioeconomic background. It is precisely this that the Christian revolution of personal imputability had overcome in contrast to ancient naturalistic determinism and tribal collective responsibility.15

6. DISTRIBUTISM: PROPERTY, FREEDOM AND THE SERVILE STATE

6.1 Belloc’s diagnosis

In The Servile State (1912), Hilaire Belloc formulated one of the most lucid diagnoses of the drift of industrial capitalism: corporate, mercantilist, and consisting of positions of privilege secured by state power for certain entrepreneurs, destined for that reason to ever more pronounced gigantism.16 Capitalism, lacking stable equilibrium, tends towards one of two outcomes: socialism (collective ownership) or the servile state, in which the majority labour without property, guaranteed subsistence but stripped of real freedom.17
G.K. Chesterton radicalised the point in The Outline of Sanity (1926): a society in which property is theoretically accessible to all but practically concentrated in the hands of a few is not a free society. It is a society in which formal freedom masks substantive servitude.18
Both drew upon Catholic social teaching: Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (1891) and Pius XI’s Quadragesimo Anno (1931) affirmed the natural right to widely distributed private property as a condition for the dignity and freedom of the human person.19

6.2 Algorithmic profiling as the codification of poverty

The connection to predictive justice is direct and inescapable. If property is concentrated and the social conditions of the propertyless are structurally precarious, an algorithmic profiling system will inevitably tend to codify poverty as a criminal risk factor. This is no accidental aberration: it is the mathematical translation of an unjust social structure.
The algorithm does not generate class prejudice — it formalises it, automates it, and endows it with the authority of scientific objectivity. Belloc’s propertyless proletarian becomes, in the predictive system, a presumed offender by status, rather than by deed. Socioeconomic profiling is the new status criminis.20

7. THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENT: ENCLOSURES, VAGRANCY AND TRANSPORTATION

7.1 The structural genesis of English pauperism

The causal chain begins with the enclosures: the progressive fencing off of common lands, accelerated by the Inclosure Act 1773 and hundreds of Private Enclosure Acts throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, stripped English peasants of the access to common land that had guaranteed their subsistence for generations. This was no natural evolution: it was a compulsory upward redistribution of property, sanctioned by a Parliament dominated by landowners.21
The individual driven from the land was not a criminal: they were the victim of a socioeconomic transformation orchestrated from above. Belloc, who retraced precisely this sequence in The Servile State, identified it as the historical origin of the modern servile condition.22

7.2 Repressive legislation as a response to the structural problem

The response of English criminal law to the question of vagrancy stands as one of the most striking historical illustrations of the status criminis. The Ordinance and Statute of Labourers (1349–1351) represented the first attempt to curb the mobility of labour following the Black Death. The Vagabonds and Beggars Act 1494 established the vagabond as a discrete criminal category. The Act for the Punishment of Sturdy Vagabonds and Beggars 1536 prescribed whipping, branding, and temporary enslavement. The Transportation Act 1718 systematised penal transportation as a criminal-justice remedy for poverty.23
The Vagrancy Act 1824, which remained in force until its formal repeal under section 81 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (with commencement subject to the enactment of replacement legislation), bears testament to the exceptional longevity of this mechanism.24

7.3 Transportation as predictive justice ante litteram

The logic of penal transportation is precisely that of predictive justice applied to a social class: I do not convict you for what you have done; I remove you for what you are and for the risk you pose to public order. This logical structure is identical to that of contemporary predictive justice. The divergence is purely technical: in place of the justice of the peace assessing the vagrant’s status empirically, we have an algorithm allocating a risk score on a statistical basis.25

8. THE CRIMINAL LAW OF INTENT AND ALGORITHMIC MORALITY

8.1 Thoughts, words, deeds and omissions: the map of imputability

The formula of the Confiteor — thoughts, words, deeds and omissions — is not accidental: it mirrors the complete topography of moral agency. Catholic moral theology punishes all four dimensions because divine judgement is omniscient and discerns intention. Internal sin (of thought or desire) is real sin — as the Sermon on the Mount teaches (‘whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart’, Matthew 5:28). Human criminal law, by contrast, operates an intentional, structural reduction: it penalises solely what is externally verifiable and causally relevant.26
Classical criminal law narrows imputability to just two elements of the liturgical formula: deeds (the actus reus, the necessary foundation) and — within strictly circumscribed statutory bounds — omissions where a duty of care exists. Thoughts are legally irrelevant except as a subjective element qualifying the act already committed (mens rea). Ulpian’s maxim cogitationis poenam nemo patitur (Digest 48.19.18) synthesises two millennia of legal tradition: no one suffers punishment for their thoughts.27

8.2 Predictive justice as offender-based criminal law

Predictive justice achieves precisely what liberal criminal law had excluded: it penalises presumed intentions and dispositions rather than accomplished acts. The algorithmic profile infers from past conduct a ‘character’ or ‘propensity’ of the individual, from which it infers the probability of a future act, upon which it bases a restrictive measure. What is punished is not an act: it is an algorithmically inferred psychological structure.
In technical terms, this is an offender-based criminal law (Täterstrafrecht) — the most perilous form of penal law, historically associated with totalitarian regimes. Offender-based criminal law punishes the individual for what they are, not for what they have done. National Socialism theorised it explicitly (the criminal as a biological-racial ‘type’); Stalinism practised it through the category of the ‘class enemy’. Predictive justice revives it in a statistical and technocratic guise, compounded further by algorithmic opacity.28

8.3 Who chooses the algorithm’s moral principles?

Every predictive justice algorithm embodies a value choice regarding what qualifies as a ‘risk factor’. That choice is opaque (proprietary systems such as COMPAS are shielded by commercial secrecy), logically ungrounded, and above all never agreed to by the subjects of control (the criteria are chosen by private software developers, not by legislatures), self-referential (the algorithm is trained on historical data reflecting past penal choices), and exempt from individual cross-examination (the algorithm cannot be cross-examined).
In Loomis v. Wisconsin (2016), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld a sentence founded upon COMPAS, notwithstanding that the defendant had been denied the ability to inspect the algorithm’s proprietary criteria. The US Supreme Court denied certiorari. This stands as the most consequential judicial precedent on the issue: it establishes that an algorithm’s trade secrecy may override a defendant’s right to challenge the grounds of their own sentencing.29
Cathy O’Neil has demonstrated systematically how algorithms of this type do not eliminate biases but formalise and multiply them, cloaking them in the authority of scientific objectivity. Frank Pasquale has documented how algorithmic opacity represents a structural problem rather than an improvable technical glitch.30

9. LOMBROSO, RACIAL PROFILING AND THE RETURN OF THE BORN CRIMINAL

9.1 The Positive School and the shift from crime to criminal

Algorithmic predictive justice does not mark the first time in penal history that judgement has migrated from the criminal act to the personality of the criminal. Cesare Lombroso, with Criminal Man (L’uomo delinquente, 1876), founded criminal anthropology upon a radical thesis: the criminal can be identified by atavistic physical anomalies — physical stigmata (cranial morphology, prognathism, facial asymmetries) purportedly revealing an innate biological predisposition to crime. The ‘born criminal’ is not punished for what they have done: they are deemed dangerous for what they are, by virtue of their biological make-up.31
The Positive School — with Lombroso, Enrico Ferri and Raffaele Garofalo — proposed an explicit overthrow of the tenets of Francesco Carrara’s Classical School: no longer the analysis of the offence as an abstract legal category and the adjudication of the moral responsibility of a free agent, but the study of the ‘natural history of the criminal’ and the calibration of punishment not to the gravity of the crime, but to the offender’s social dangerousness, conceived as an empirically observable likelihood of committing future offences. Ferri formulated Criminal Sociology concurrently, repudiating free will and founding criminal law upon the deterministic prevention of crime.32
Lombrosian doctrine was opposed by the Catholic tradition precisely because it undermined the dogma of free will: if crime is biologically determined, there is no moral responsibility, no imputability, and no redemption possible. The Thomistic critique of actus humanus as the foundation of judgement converged with classical legal critique: both rejected the reduction of the individual to a predetermined natural type.

9.2 Racial profiling as algorithmic Lombrosianism

The connection between Lombrosian theory and contemporary predictive justice is not merely historical: it is structural. In both cases, the subject is classified as dangerous not for an act committed, but for traits deemed indicative of a propensity towards crime. In Lombroso, those traits were somatic and biological; in predictive justice, they are statistical and socioeconomic. Yet the logic is identical: from nature (biological or statistical), future conduct is inferred; from future conduct, present restraint is justified.
Racial profiling — the reliance on race or ethnicity as a risk factor in policing practices and the penal system — is the most explicit contemporary manifestation of this nexus. In predictive justice systems, race is not necessarily an explicit variable within the model: it is a proxy variable embedded in the historical data on which the algorithm is trained. If the penal system has historically arrested and convicted minorities at disproportionate rates, the data reflects this history; the algorithm absorbs it as a norm and reproduces it as a prediction. As the UN Special Rapporteur on racism documented, ‘bias from the past leads to bias in the future’: socioeconomic variables (postcode of residence, educational attainment, economic circumstances) operate as proxies for race, perpetuating historical discrimination under the neutral veneer of statistics.33
This vicious cycle has been documented empirically: predictive policing algorithms increase surveillance in minority-majority neighbourhoods; heightened surveillance generates more arrests; higher arrest rates update the model, confirming the neighbourhood’s ‘dangerousness’; the model directs further surveillance. This is not a remediable technical defect: it is a self-fulfilling prophecy structurally embedded within the logic of the system.34

9.3 From biology to statistics: a structural continuity

The difference between Lombroso and algorithmic predictive justice is one of language and methodology, not of logical structure. Lombroso measured craniums and catalogued physical stigmata; the algorithm calculates risk scores across socioeconomic variables. Yet both execute the very same fundamental operation: they infer future dangerousness from the subject’s present nature, bypassing the mediation of the free and imputable act. Both claim the mantle of science: Lombroso that of positivist anthropology, the algorithm that of machine learning.
The critique levelled against Lombroso by the Classical School and the Catholic tradition applies with equal force to predictive justice. Francesco Carrara identified the heart of the problem with precision: criminal law cannot dispense with moral imputability, namely the capacity of the subject to understand and to will at the moment of the act. Shifting judgement from responsibility for an accomplished deed to dangerousness inherent in the nature or attributes of the subject means abandoning criminal law and replacing it with a biological or statistical police — with the distinction that Lombroso was at least candid in his premises, whereas the algorithmic apparatus presents itself as neutral and objective.35

10. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CHILLING EFFECT AND THOUGHT POLICE

9.1 Freedom of expression and its foundations

Freedom of thought and expression — Article 21 of the Italian Constitution; Article 10 of the ECHR; Article 19 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — presupposes that thought remains outside the purview of the law until it translates into acts. John Stuart Mill, in his foundational On Liberty (1859), enunciated the harm principle: power can only be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, to prevent harm to others, not to manage the statistical probability of his future behaviour.36
The European Court of Human Rights has consistently affirmed in its case law that freedom of expression extends even to ideas that ‘offend, shock or disturb’: its essential core cannot be sacrificed in the name of preventative security.37

9.2 The chilling effect as constitutional harm

The doctrine of the chilling effect — formulated by the US Supreme Court from the 1950s onwards — recognises that the threat of legal sanctions can suppress the exercise of fundamental rights even in the absence of an explicit prohibition. If predictive justice correlates certain types of speech, associations, or online browsing patterns with criminal risk profiles, it produces precisely this outcome: it does not ban thought, but makes it statistically hazardous.38
Stefano Rodotà observed with great acuity that pervasive digital surveillance functions not merely as an instrument of ex post repression, but as a mechanism of ex ante conformism: individuals alter their behaviour — including their intellectual expression — when they know or suspect they are being monitored. The digital panopticon does not need to intervene to prove effective: it suffices that its presence is perceived as possible.39

9.3 Pre-crime and the thought police as logical outcome

George Orwell, in Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), described a thought police that intervenes against crime before it manifests: crimethink is punished not for what it causes, but for what it is. Algorithmic predictive justice reproduces this structure with an added layer: the authority of science. Orwell’s Big Brother was overt in his arbitrariness; the algorithm presents itself as neutral, objective, and inevitable.40
The issue is far from purely theoretical. Four levels of usurpation overlap and intertwine: ontologically, what has not yet occurred is punished; subjectively, what one is, rather than what one has done, is punished; cognitively, inferred intentions and dispositions are punished; politically, a moral code is imposed without any corresponding consent from the victim, not even in the deeply imperfect form of so-called ‘democratic legitimacy’. Predictive justice is no remediable technical hitch: it is the simultaneous subversion of four foundational tenets of liberal jurisprudence.41

11. SYNTHESIS: THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF STATUS CRIMINALISATION

The thread traversing this article can now be stated in full. The enclosures structurally generated the condition of the propertyless. The vagrancy laws criminalised that condition. Penal transportation provided a risk-management remedy ante litteram. Belloc and Chesterton identified this sequence as the genesis of the modern servile state. Catholic moral theology has unyieldingly insisted upon personal imputability of the act as the sole basis of judgement. The Austrian School, from Mises to Hoppe, has demonstrated why the forecasting of future individual action is categorically impossible. Classical jurisprudence codified all of this in the maxim da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius.
Predictive justice powered by artificial intelligence systematically dismantles all of these bulwarks. It represents no technical novelty: it is the resurrection, through computational machinery, of a logic of criminalisation based on social status. And it introduces a new echelon of danger: its appetite for algorithmic morality — the imposition of behavioural and cognitive standards dictated by private entities without any channel of review for the system’s victims — renders it potentially an instrument of thought control, not merely the control of actions.
The gravest danger is not a technical glitch — that the algorithm errs in an isolated case. The gravest danger is the naturalisation of this logic: that mathematical formalisation confers upon a socioeconomic equation the authority of scientific objectivity, rendering invisible the underlying value judgement upon which it rests.42

12. CONCLUSIONS: FOR A JUSTICE THAT REMAINS FAITHFUL TO THE FACT

The preceding analysis suggests several methodological conclusions for the debate surrounding the deployment of artificial intelligence within the penal system. These conclusions take on heightened urgency with the recent announcement by the Italian government regarding the imminent roll-out of systematic AI use in policing operations.
First, the distinction between fact and forecast is not technical but ontological. No algorithmic refinement can bridge this chasm, because future human action is not a concealed data point waiting to be unearthed, but a reality that does not yet exist. Da mihi factum is not an obstacle to be bypassed: it is the logical foundation of judicial determination.
Second, the application of AI to criminal justice is never neutral. In a society where property is concentrated and socioeconomic conditions are radically unequal owing to privileges engendered by fiat currency and state regulation, any statistical profiling system will inevitably codify that inequality into a presumption of dangerousness. This dilemma cannot be cured through technical adjustments: it demands an examination of the distributive structure of society itself.
Third, legal, philosophical and theological traditions furnish critical resources that would be perilous to neglect. The Roman law principle of liability rooted in the fact, the Catholic doctrine of actus humanus and personal imputability, the Austrian critique of the impossibility of economic calculation absent private property, and the Distributist indictment of the servile state: all of these traditions converge in demonstrating that a justice faithful to human dignity must inherently be a justice of the fact, not of prediction.
Fourth, the spectre of an algorithmic thought police is not science fiction, but the coherent logical extension of the principles upon which predictive justice already functions. When a system begins to infer dangerousness from speech, associations and online browsing habits, the boundary separating the punishment of an act from the surveillance of thought dissolves. Maar’s Sams grants wishes; the algorithm suppresses thought — with the same literal precision, and the same indifference to the human cost.

Notes

1 Paul Maar, Eine Woche voller Samstage, Verlag Friedrich Oetinger, Hamburg, 1973 (first volume in the Das Sams series). The quotation «Du musst viel, viel genauer wünschen» appears in the second volume: Paul Maar, Am Samstag kam das Sams zurück, Verlag Friedrich Oetinger, Hamburg, 1980, p. 37. The series comprises eleven volumes and has sold over six million copies; it is regarded as a classic of German-language children’s literature.
2 The principle da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius has an established Roman-law provenance and encapsulates the structure of classical legal reasoning: the legal rule applies to the fact, rather than preceding it in terms of individual imputation. See Charles Perelman, Logique juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique, Dalloz, Paris, 1976.
3 Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, Lauren Kirchner, ‘Machine Bias’, ProPublica, 23 May 2016. The investigation demonstrated that COMPAS systematically overestimated the risk of recidivism for African American defendants compared to white defendants, effectively codifying pre-existing socioeconomic inequalities into a seemingly objective verdict.
4 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949, ch. I (‘Acting Man’). Italian edition: L’azione umana. Trattato di economia, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2021. The axiom is also expounded in Ludwig von Mises, Nationalökonomie: Theorie des Handelns und Wirtschaftens, Editions Union, Geneva, 1940.
5 Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1957. Mises draws a rigorous distinction between the natural sciences, which deal with constants and regularities, and the sciences of action, which deal with irreducibly free individual choices.
6 F.A. Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, American Economic Review, vol. 35, no. 4, 1945, pp. 519–530. This essay, together with ‘Economics and Knowledge’ (Economica, vol. 4, no. 13, 1937, pp. 33–54), constitutes the epistemological cornerstone of the Hayekian critique of socialism.
7 F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1952. Therein Hayek develops his critique of ‘scientism’ — namely, the attempt to apply the methods of the natural sciences to the social sciences.
8 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. I (Rules and Order), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973. Hayek distinguishes between thesis (deliberately constructed order) and nomos (spontaneous order emerging from individual action). Predictive justice belongs to the logic of thesis, purporting to construct ex ante that which classical law can only judge ex post.
9 Jörg Guido Hülsmann, ‘Knowledge, Judgment, and the Use of Property’, Review of Austrian Economics, vol. 10, no. 1, 1997, pp. 23–48. Hülsmann contends that the problem of socialism is insoluble not because information is lacking, but because without private property, rational economic calculation is structurally impossible.
10 Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1989, ch. V–VI. See also Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1993 (2nd ed., Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, 2006).
11 Hans-Hermann Hoppe, ‘Of Private, Common, and Public Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization’, Libertarian Papers, vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. The theme of property as the logical foundation of any rational system of adjudication is developed in this essay in a manner especially pertinent to our argument.
12 Catechism of the Catholic Church, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1992, §§1730–1748 (freedom and moral responsibility) and §§1849–1876 (sin). For the Thomistic foundation, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, qq. 6–21 (De voluntario et involuntario).
13 Catechism of the Catholic Church, op. cit., §1735. The doctrine is expounded by Servais Pinckaers O.P., The Sources of Christian Ethics, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1995 (original work Les sources de la morale chrétienne, Fribourg, 1985), in particular ch. X–XI on the structure of the human act.
14 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 61 (De iustitia) and q. 108 (De vindicatione). See also Giuseppe Graneris, Contributi tomistici alla filosofia del diritto, SEI, Turin, 1949.
15 Saint Augustine, De libero arbitrio. See also Francesco Compagnoni, Giannino Piana (eds), Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia Morale, Paoline, Cinisello Balsamo, 1990, entries Imputabilità and Peccato.
16 See also Kevin Carson, Organization Theory, 2008, ch. II on economies of scale as the result of distortions caused by state intervention.
17 Hilaire Belloc, The Servile State, T.N. Foulis, London–Edinburgh, 1912. The text is available in the Ludwig von Mises Institute archives. The central thesis is that industrial capitalism is unstable: it inevitably produces the concentration of property and the dependence of the majority.
18 G.K. Chesterton, The Outline of Sanity, Methuen & Co., London, 1926. See also G.K. Chesterton, What’s Wrong with the World, Cassell and Company, London, 1910. For a systematic analysis of Distributism, see John Médaille, Toward a Truly Free Market: A Distributist Perspective on the Role of Government, Taxes, Health Care, Deficits, and More, ISI Books, Wilmington (DE), 2010.
19 Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Rerum Novarum, 15 May 1891, §§4–14. Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Quadragesimo Anno, 15 May 1931, §§105–110 on the concentration of wealth and the principle of subsidiarity.
20 The concept of status criminis — criminal liability predicated not upon the deed but upon the condition of the subject — is critically analysed in Bernard Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007. Harcourt demonstrates empirically how actuarial systems tend to concentrate surveillance upon the most socioeconomically disadvantaged strata.
21 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1944. See also E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Victor Gollancz, London, 1963.
22 Hilaire Belloc, The Servile State, op. cit., ch. IV–V, where Belloc charts how the English Reformation — through the confiscation of monastic lands — initiated the process of property concentration that the enclosures would consummate.
23 For a systematic treatment of vagrancy legislation, see Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh et al., Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England, Allen Lane, London, 1975. E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act, Allen Lane, London, 1975 analyses the Black Act 1723, which transformed traditional plebeian practices into capital felonies. See also A.L. Beier, Masterless Men: The Vagrancy Problem in England 1560–1640, Methuen, London, 1985.
24 The Vagrancy Act 1824 (5 Geo. 4 c. 83): section 81 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 provides for its repeal, conditional upon the commencement of replacement legislation not yet fully in force. On the history of penal transportation, see Robert Hughes, The Fatal Shore: A History of the Transportation of Convicts to Australia, Collins Harvill, London, 1987.
25 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, Gallimard, Paris, 1975 (English ed. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Allen Lane, London, 1977). Foucault analyses how the birth of the modern prison corresponds to a mutation in the object of punitive power: no longer the body of the condemned (supplice), but their identity and soul.
26 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 74 (De peccatis interioribus): Aquinas distinguishes sins of thought from sins of deed; both are moral sins, yet human law cannot punish the former. See also I-II, q. 91, a. 4 (De lege humana): ‘human law cannot forbid all that the natural law forbids... it confines itself to repressing the most grievous vices’.
27 Ulpian, Digest, 48.19.18: ‘Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur’. The principle is reaffirmed and systematised in modern penal theory in: Claus Roxin, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, Band I, C.H. Beck, Munich, 4th ed. 2006, §8 (the principle of the act, Tatstrafrecht, as the cornerstone of liberal criminal law). See also Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale, Laterza, Rome–Bari, 1989, ch. II (the principle of materiality).
28 Claus Roxin, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, op. cit., §6: systematic distinction between Tatstrafrecht (act-based criminal law) and Täterstrafrecht (offender-based criminal law). See Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione, op. cit., ch. IV, on ‘criminal law of the enemy’ as an authoritarian degeneration of the contemporary penal system.
29 Loomis v. Wisconsin, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). Eric Loomis was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment; the trial judge consulted the COMPAS score while asserting that it would not serve as the exclusive basis for the sentence. The Wisconsin Supreme Court permitted the use of the tool, but laid down certain cautions, acknowledging the perils of a system whose methodological underpinnings could not be subjected to adversarial scrutiny.
30 Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy, Crown Publishers, New York, 2016. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2015.
31 Cesare Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente studiato in rapporto all’antropologia, alla medicina legale e alle discipline carcerarie, Hoepli, Milan, 1876 (first edition). The work reached its fifth edition in 1897 (Vincenzo Bona, Turin), substantially expanded. Lombroso estimated that 70% of the worst offenders belonged to the category of the ‘born criminal’, namely individuals in whom criminality is ingrained in their biological nature — incorrigible subjects to be confined or eliminated in the name of social defence.
32 Enrico Ferri, Sociologia criminale, 5th ed., Utet, Turin, 1929 (first edition I nuovi orizzonti del diritto e della procedura penale, Zanichelli, Bologna, 1881). Raffaele Garofalo, Criminologia, Bocca, Turin, 1885. The Positive School explicitly opposed its method to that of the Classical School: see Francesco Carrara, Programma del corso di diritto criminale, Fratelli Cammelli, Florence, 1859, wherein an offence is defined as the ‘infringement of a law of the State, enacted to protect the security of citizens, resulting from an external human act, positive or negative, morally imputable and politically harmful’ — a definition presupposing freedom, imputability, and an accomplished act.
33 Ashwini K.P., United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Report on racism and artificial intelligence, OHCHR, 2024: ‘bias from the past leads to bias in the future’. See also Rashida Richardson, Jason Schultz, Kate Crawford, ‘Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice’, New York University Law Review Online, vol. 94, 2019, pp. 15–55: the study documents how numerous American predictive policing systems were trained on data compiled during periods of documented systematic racial discrimination by law enforcement agencies.
34 Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, Lauren Kirchner, ‘Machine Bias’, ProPublica, 2016, op. cit. The mechanism of the racial feedback loop in predictive policing algorithms is systematically analysed in Bernard Harcourt, Against Prediction, op. cit., ch. V, and in Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction, op. cit., ch. 5.
35 Francesco Carrara, Programma del corso di diritto criminale, op. cit., §30: ‘The right to punish arises solely from the offence committed, and is measured by the imputability of the perpetrator and the gravity of the harm’. The critique of social dangerousness as the foundation of penal sanction is developed in Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione, op. cit., ch. II–IV, wherein Ferrajoli demonstrates how the notion of social dangerousness, while formally surviving in the Italian legal order under security measures (Arts. 202–212 of the Criminal Code), remains compatible with procedural guarantees (garantismo) only to the extent that it requires an offence actually committed as an indispensable prerequisite.
36 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, John W. Parker and Son, London, 1859, ch. I. The harm principle is the classical liberal foundation of any legitimate restraint upon individual liberty: the law intervenes upon the act productive of harm, not upon the psychological disposition that might engender it. See also Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione, op. cit., for the due-process elaboration of the principle within continental criminal law.
37 European Court of Human Rights, Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 December 1976 (App. no. 5493/72), §49: freedom of expression applies ‘not only for “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also for those that offend, shock or disturb’. See also ECtHR, Oberschlick v. Austria, 23 May 1991.
38 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965): the first explicit recognition of the chilling effect by the US Supreme Court. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967): the chilling effect as an actionable injury to fundamental freedoms. The Court of Justice of the European Union adopted analogous reasoning in Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12, 8 April 2014: mass surveillance as a breach of privacy exercising a deterrent effect on freedom of expression.
39 Stefano Rodotà, Il mondo nella rete. Quali i diritti, quali i vincoli, Laterza, Rome–Bari, 2014. Rodotà, among Europe’s foremost scholars of law and technology, likens algorithmic surveillance to Bentham’s panopticon as revisited by Foucault: a control mechanism operating via the internalisation of visibility on the part of the observed subject.
40 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, Secker & Warburg, London, 1949. The concepts of thoughtcrime and Newspeak as instruments of cognitive control have been widely analysed from a legal-political perspective. See Philip K. Dick, The Minority Report, in Science Fiction Stories, 1956: pre-crime as a narrative dystopia anticipating with pinpoint accuracy the logic of contemporary predictive justice.
41 Massimo Donini, Il volto attuale dell’illecito penale, Giuffrè, Milan, 2004, examines the crisis of act-based criminal law in the contemporary Italian legal system and its drift towards forms of criminal law of the enemy. See also Sergio Moccia, La perenne emergenza. Tendenze autoritarie nel sistema penale, ESI, Naples, 2nd ed. 1997.
42 Antoinette Rouvroy, Thomas Berns, ‘Gouvernementalité algorithmique et perspectives d’émancipation: le disparate comme condition d’individuation par la relation?’, Réseaux, no. 177, 2013, pp. 163–196 (DOI: 10.3917/res.177.0163). Rouvroy and Berns demonstrate how algorithmic governmentality does not merely describe social reality, but produces and regulates it, systematically bypassing individual subjectivity.