What is a dictatorship? The historical evolution of VAT and personal income tax in Spain and Italy, and of public spending as a percentage of GDP

A comparative study: from Francoism and Fascism to democratic tax reforms, up to the present day (1922/1939–2026)

Translation of the article published on the website of the Property and Freedom Society 

Fascism in Italy and Francoism in Spain are regimes unanimously recognised as tyrannical or dictatorial, characterized by the suppression of fundamental freedoms. Their end—traumatic and accompanied by military defeat in the Second World War for Italy, and progressive, with a gradual transition towards the restoration of the monarchy and representative democracy for Spain—is widely regarded as a blessing for the populations subjected to them. The history of both Italian Fascism and Spanish Francoism is complex, and the official, accepted version of mainstream historiography fails to grasp the issues connected with the emergence and persistence of both regimes, ultimately painting a black-and-white picture with clearly drawn good and bad sides. In all of this, Fascism and Francoism are frequently lumped together with far more dangerous and destructive regimes such as National Socialism, and anyone who opposed the Italian and Spanish fascists is glorified as a bearer of freedom—even when those opponents were Soviet Russians or Anglo-Americans, regimes that had their own interests at heart, certainly not the freedom of Spaniards and Italians who, nevertheless, continue every 25 April to celebrate their liberation from themselves.

This study aims to examine the question of the two regimes—Fascist and Francoist—from another perspective, namely the fiscal one, through a comparative analysis of two taxes in particular, value added tax and income tax, and through statistical records of the cost of the State in relation to gross domestic product. If the time devoted by the subjects of any State to fulfilling their tax obligations provides a measure of the public apparatus's intrusiveness into private lives, and if, conversely, the time left to each individual to pursue their own interests and earn an income to consume on their own without state interference is a suitable metric for assessing the degree of freedom granted to each individual by the state organisation, then how much freedom did the Fascists and Francoists leave to private individuals compared to what remains for citizens of modern Italian and Spanish democracies? A comparative analysis of the two systems leads to the conclusion, which will surprise some, that there was far more freedom under the Caudillo and the Duce than remains today.

PART I — SPAIN
1. The Francoist tax system (1939–1977)
During the Francoist period, neither a value added tax nor an income tax in the modern sense existed. Indirect taxation was based on the Impuesto General sobre el Tráfico de Empresas, established in 1964, which remained the principal Spanish indirect tax instrument until 1985, when it was replaced by VAT ahead of accession to the EEC.1 Direct taxation, for its part, remained anchored to the nineteenth-century model of impuestos reales or de producto—sectoral and schedular levies lacking a single, personal, comprehensive and progressive tax on aggregate income.

In quantitative terms, the Francoist State remained modest in size, even in domestic historical comparison: in 1960, public spending as a percentage of GDP was comparable to levels seen under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in the 1920s, testifying, according to some, to the relative backwardness of the Spanish public sector compared to the European average,2 but in truth demonstrating the modest invasiveness of the Spanish State regarding the incomes of citizens, which were left largely in the pockets of the Spanish people. Only from the 1960s onwards, with the expansion of compulsory social security (1967) and the economic growth of «desarrollismo», did public spending begin to rise slowly, while still remaining in 1970 at around 22.5% of GDP—over fourteen percentage points below the average of the four largest countries in the European Community.3

2. The tax reform of the Transition (1973–1978)
The attempt at comprehensive reform predated Franco's death. In June 1973, Enrique Fuentes Quintana, then an adviser to the Ministry of Finance, submitted a plan for comprehensive fiscal reform to the Head of State: although apparently well received, the project led to the immediate dismissal of the politician responsible for the initiative and the destruction of existing copies of the text—a sign of the structural incompatibility between the alleged dictatorship and a universal, progressive tax system,4 or, according to another possible interpretation, a sign of the Caudillo's foresight in perceiving the introduction of such a tax system as the first step towards the destruction of the economic freedom of Spaniards.

It was only after the elections of June 1977 that the reform could be enacted, through the Ley de Medidas Urgentes de Reforma Fiscal, with Fuentes Quintana serving as Economic Vice President of the Suárez Government and Francisco Fernández Ordóñez as the executing minister. The law introduced the Impuesto sobre el Patrimonio as an ancillary tax to income taxation and, the following year, with Ley 44/1978 of 8 September, the first single, general, personal, comprehensive, and progressive tax on the income of natural persons in Spanish history.5 In its original form, the IRPF provided for twenty-eight income brackets, with marginal rates ranging between 15% and 65.5%, and an obligation to file a return for incomes over 300,000 pesetas; the tax was levied on the family unit, a feature that would prove to be the source of the first major overhaul of the tax.6

3. The evolution of the IRPF (1978–2026)
Since 1978, the IRPF has undergone three major comprehensive reforms (1991, 1998, 2006–2007) and numerous minor adjustments, with a consistent trend towards reducing the number of tax brackets and narrowing the spread between the minimum and maximum rates.7 In summary:

1978 (Ley 44/1978): 28 brackets, rates of 15%–65.5%. First comprehensive and progressive tax; mandatory family taxation; tax-free allowance applied as a deduction from the tax liability (rather than from the tax base).
1991 (first major reform): 17 brackets, rates of 20%–56%. Reform following judgment STC 45/1989 on mandatory joint taxation, which was declared unconstitutional.
1998 (second major reform): 6 brackets, rates of 18%–48%. Introduction of the «mínimo personal y familiar»; initial framework of the dual income tax.
2001–2002: 5 brackets, rates of 18%–45%. Further simplification of the state tax scale.
2006–2007 (Solbes reform): 4 brackets, rates of 24%–43%. Abolition of the lowest bracket; capital income (interest, dividends, insurance payouts) taxed at a flat rate of 18%, regardless of the recipient's income level.
2012–2013: 7 brackets (temporary), rates of 24.75%–52%. Anti-crisis «gravamen complementario» (Rajoy Government); partial and temporary restoration of progressivity.
2015 (Montoro reform): 5 brackets, rates of 19%–45%. Across-the-board reduction of statutory rates.
2021–2026: 6 state brackets + tramo autonómico, rates of 19%–47%. New bracket on employment income > €300,000; capital income taxed up to 30% above €300,000; pronounced territorial disparity as a result of the devolution of regulatory powers to the Autonomous Communities since 1997.
The most significant finding, for the purposes of evaluating the real tax burden, is that the statutory progressivity of 1978—where the top rate was more than four times the lowest rate—has been virtually halved today: following the 2006 reform, the ratio between the highest and lowest brackets does not even reach double.8

To this must be added an empirically substantial bracket creep (fiscal drag) effect: a recent study on the real tax burden shows that, for an equivalent purchasing power, a taxpayer subject to the average rate in 1978 paid 16%, whereas that same real taxpayer in 2025 bears a burden almost eight percentage points higher, despite the nominal reductions in statutory rates introduced by subsequent reforms—a sign that the failure systematically to adjust brackets and tax-free allowances for inflation has resulted in a hidden increase in the tax burden.9

4. The evolution of VAT (1986–2026)
VAT was introduced in Spain on 1 January 1986, simultaneously with the country's accession to the European Economic Community, replacing the Impuesto General sobre el Tráfico de Empresas under Ley 30/1985 of 2 August—subsequently replaced by the current Ley 37/1992 of 28 December, adopted in the context of the harmonisation of the European Single Market.10

1986: standard rate 12%, reduced 6%, increased (luxury) 33%.
1992: standard rate 13%, reduced 6%, increased 28%.
1993: standard rate 15%, reduced 6%, super-reduced 3%; increased rate abolished.
1995: standard rate 16%, reduced 7%, super-reduced 4%.
2010: standard rate 18%, reduced 8%, super-reduced 4%.
2012–present: standard rate 21%, reduced 10%, super-reduced 4%.
The increased rate on luxury goods, initially set at 33%, was lowered to 28% in 1992 and definitively abolished in 1993 within the framework of Community VAT harmonisation, alongside the introduction of the super-reduced rate at 3% (later 4%).11 The standard rate has almost doubled between 1986 and the present day, rising from 12% to 21%, representing an overall increase of nine percentage points in thirty-nine years; the last increase occurred in 2012, in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis under the Rajoy Government.12 Currently, the reduced rate of 10% applies to foodstuffs not covered by the lower rate and to certain recreational and cultural events, while the super-reduced rate of 4% covers basic necessities (bread, milk, eggs, books, medicines).13

5. Public spending as a percentage of GDP (1960–2026)
The indicator of public expenditure as a proportion of GDP provides the most succinct measure of the Spanish State's dimensional expansion in the second half of the twentieth century: from a level close to 15% in the 1950s and 1960s, comparable to that of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, Spain converged—with a historical lag of roughly two decades behind its European partners—towards the oppressive levels of a continental welfare state, surpassing 45% of GDP from the 1990s onwards. The comparatively greater freedom that is still felt in Spain is the legacy of a tax regime more respectful of liberty and property, the memory of which has largely been lost in other countries.14

1960: ≈ 13–15% of GDP. Level comparable to the Primo de Rivera dictatorship; Francoist autarky.
1970: 22.5% of GDP. 14.2 points below the average of the 4 largest EC countries.
1975: ≈ 25% of GDP. End of Francoism; social transfers at 17% of GDP.
1982: ≈ 34–37% of GDP. Social transfers at 23% of GDP; onset of socialist governments.
1990: 43.3% of GDP. Only 4.2 points below the average of the 4 largest EC countries (47.5%).
1992–1993: ≈ 45–48% of GDP. Peak prior to Maastricht convergence.
1995–2007: 38–42% of GDP. Fiscal consolidation for euro accession; property boom.
2009–2012: 46–48% of GDP. Global financial and sovereign debt crisis; automatic stabilisers.
2020: > 52% of GDP. COVID-19 pandemic.
2024: 45.5% of GDP. Public debt at 100.8% of GDP in 2025 (compared to the historical low of 16.6% in 1980).
In the most recent European comparison, Spain stood at 42% of GDP in 2019, slightly below the EU-28 average (43%) and EU-15 average (46%), but above the figures for the United States (38%) and Japan (39%)—confirming a European welfare state model of intermediate intensity.15 The most recent data put Spanish public expenditure at 45.5% of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2024, with public debt reaching 100.80% of GDP in 2025—contrasting with an all-time low of 16.60% recorded in 1980, a legacy of the Francoist administration, in the immediate aftermath of the Transition.16

6. Concluding remarks
The Spanish fiscal trajectory from 1939 to the present can be read as the transition from a minimal state to a continental-style welfare state, achieved in a compressed timeframe compared to its Western European partners. Under the dictator Franco, Spaniards spent less than a fifth of their time and energy maintaining the state apparatus; today, they devote nearly half of their energies to funding a bloated structure, on par with those of other European states, amid widespread awareness that money burned upon the fiscal altar is largely squandered and channelled into administrations that are largely corrupt, deploying tax revenues for their own benefit rather than that of the citizens.17 The paradoxical conclusion is clear: the Francoist dictatorship left far more money in the pockets of its citizens. The modern, democratic Spanish State is a fiscal leviathan devouring ever more intolerable shares of Spanish incomes.

PART II — ITALY
7. The tax system from Fascism to the eve of the reform (1922–1973)
Unlike the Spanish case, where the break of 1978–1986 introduced income tax and VAT ex novo, in Italy the two taxes arose from a radical replacement of pre-existing levies whose origins traced back to the liberal and Fascist eras. On the indirect taxation of transactions, the Fascist regime established in 1940, in the midst of a war economy, the Imposta Generale sull'Entrata (IGE), a multi-stage, cumulative («cascading») indirect tax introduced by Royal Decree-Law 2/1940, converted into Law 762/1940, which struck every commercial transaction—from imports to retail sales, including professional services—without any deduction mechanism for tax paid upstream.18 This «cascading» nature—markedly different from the so-called «neutrality» of the future VAT—made the tax burdensome (although one must bear in mind the extremely low rates when compared to those of VAT) for long production chains, thereby incentivising vertical integration among enterprises.

As regards direct taxation, the Italian tax system remained anchored until 1973 to the nineteenth-century liberal model, subsequently revised in part by the Vanoni reform of 1951: a plurality of real (or «in rem») taxes—imposta di ricchezza mobile, tax on land, tax on buildings, tax on agricultural income—accompanied by a progressive personal supplementary tax on total income and the family tax at municipal level, in a schedular structure by income source very similar in its logic to the pre-1978 Francoist system.19

8. The tax reform of 1971–1974 (The Cosciani-Visentini Reform)
The sweeping Italian tax reform, prepared by the work of the Cosciani Commission (1963–1966) and enacted by Enabling Law No. 825 of 9 October 1971 under the political responsibility of Finance Minister Bruno Visentini, ran parallel to—and roughly seven years ahead of—the Spanish reform, sharing its Europeanist impetus: the alleged need to harmonise the national tax system with Community directives regarding turnover taxes.20

By Presidential Decree No. 633 of 26 October 1972, VAT replaced the IGE with effect from 1 January 1973, in implementation of Community Directives 67/227/EEC and 67/228/EEC on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes.21 The following year, on 1 January 1974, the delegated decrees on direct taxation entered into force: the old real taxes (movable wealth, buildings, land, agricultural income) and personal taxes (supplementary tax, family tax) were replaced by the Personal Income Tax (IRPEF) and the Corporate Income Tax (IRPEG), alongside the Local Income Tax (ILOR), under Presidential Decrees Nos. 597, 598 and 599 of 29 September 1973, respectively.22

9. The evolution of IRPEF (1974–2026)
In its original version, IRPEF featured a strongly progressive structure: 32 marginal rates, ranging between 10% and 72%, applied to very closely spaced income brackets—a number of brackets almost identical to that of the contemporaneous Spanish IRPF (28 in 1978), confirming a common continental European model of comprehensive and steeply progressive taxation.23 In summary:

1974 (Presidential Decree 597/1973): 32 brackets, rates of 10%–72%. Replaced real taxes (movable wealth, buildings, land) and the progressive supplementary tax; very few taxpayers in the highest brackets.
1983 (Spadolini reform): 9 brackets, rates of 18%–65%. First major simplification: from 32 to 9 brackets; maximum threshold reduced to just over the equivalent of €800,000 today.
1986 (Consolidated Act, Presidential Decree 917/1986): 9 brackets, rates of 12%–62%. Merging of IRPEF and IRPEG (later IRES) into the TUIR, replacing the 1973 decrees.
1989–1997: 7 brackets, rates of 10%–50%. Further reduction in brackets; 1990s: increased burden on the middle classes to achieve convergence towards the euro.
1998–2001 (Visco reform): 5 brackets, rates of 18.5%–45.5%. Continued simplification; introduction of deductions for the «no tax area».
2002–2021: 5 brackets, rates of 23%–43%. Minimum rate at 23%, maximum at 43% (above €75,000); maximum rate threshold repeatedly lowered, from 1 million to €75,000, across four successive interventions in the 1990s.
2022–2023: 4 brackets, rates of 23%–43%. Merger of the second and third brackets (2022 budget law).
2024–2026: 3 brackets, rates of 23%–43%. Further consolidation (first two brackets unified at 23% up to €28,000); optional «flat tax» regime for self-employed income (lump-sum regime) and for high-income new residents.
The Italian trajectory shares the same underlying dynamic as the Spanish one: a drastic reduction in the number of brackets—from 32 to 3 in fifty years, compared to 28 reduced to 4–6 in Spain—accompanied by a narrowing of the spread between the lowest and highest rates. Unlike the Spanish case, however, the Italian compression occurred primarily by lowering the entry threshold for the top marginal rate rather than by reducing the rate itself: in the 1990s, in the face of alleged high levels of tax evasion and the revenue demands imposed by the convergence criteria for the euro, the main lever used was the progressive reduction of the income threshold at which the top rate kicked in, lowered in four successive interventions from one million to the current 75 thousand euros.24

10. The evolution of VAT in Italy (1973–2026)
The standard Italian VAT rate has followed a more restrained path than its Spanish counterpart, starting from an already higher initial level (12% in 1973, compared to Spain's 12% in 1986, but starting fifteen years earlier) up to the current 22%.

1973: standard rate 12%, reduced 6%. Replacement of the IGE (Presidential Decree 633/1972); multiple rates up to 30% for luxury goods.
1980: standard rate 15%, reduced 8–9%. First revision following the oil crises.
1988: standard rate 19%, reduced 9%, super-reduced 4%. Harmonisation in view of the European Single Market (1993).
1997: standard rate 20%, reduced 10%, super-reduced 4%. Fiscal package for euro accession («Eurotax»).
2011: standard rate 21%, reduced 10%, super-reduced 4%. Tremonti anti-crisis package (Decree-Law 138/2011).
2013–present: standard rate 22%, reduced 10%, super-reduced 4%. Decree-Law 76/2013; standard rate unchanged since 2013.
The rates currently in force are 22% (standard), 10%, and 4%, the latter reserved for basic necessities.25 A common structural feature of both experiences should be noted: in both countries, the last significant increase in the standard rate (2012 in Spain, 2011–2013 in Italy) occurred in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, confirming VAT's role as a tool for swift fiscal extortion during financial emergencies—unlike IRPF/IRPEF, the reform of which requires a longer political timeframe.

11. Public spending as a percentage of GDP in Italy (1930–2026)
Italian long-term data series are less fragmented than the Spanish ones, thanks to the continuity of accounting records even through the wartime and Fascist periods, albeit with obvious distortions linked to the war economy and extraordinary expenditure. A summary figure commonly cited by comparative literature on belligerent states: in the countries hit hardest by the Second World War—France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom—public expenditure exceeded 25% of GDP as early as the immediate post-war era, a level that in pre-war Fascist Italy was instead kept within tighter margins, typical of a state still oriented towards a balanced budget, barring extraordinary spending for autarky and rearmament.26

1930 (approx.): ≈ 15–18% of GDP. Liberal/Fascist state with a constrained budget, barring extraordinary war and autarky expenditures.
1945–1950: > 25% of GDP. Post-war reconstruction; initial welfare programmes (Reconstruction, Cassa del Mezzogiorno from 1950).
1960: 29% of GDP. Economic boom; tax burden at 25.7% of GDP.
1973: ≈ 33–35% of GDP. Oil crisis; launch of the Visentini tax reform.
1980: ≈ 42% of GDP. Expansion of social spending; debt-to-GDP at 56.9%.
1985: ≈ 48% of GDP. Tax burden at 34.6% of GDP (compared to the EU average of 41% and France's 45%).
1990: 53.5% of GDP. Historical peak prior to fiscal consolidation; social spending as a share of GDP doubled in thirty years.
1992–1997: ≈ 50–53% of GDP. Consolidation packages for euro entry (1997 «Eurotax»).
2000–2007: ≈ 46–48% of GDP. Consolidation within the eurozone.
2009–2013: ≈ 50–51% of GDP. Financial and sovereign debt crisis.
2020: ≈ 57% of GDP. COVID-19 pandemic.
2024: 50.6% of GDP. Tax burden 42.6% of GDP; public debt 135.3% of GDP.
Over the thirty-year span from 1960 to 1990, Italian public spending more than doubled relative to GDP, rising from 29% to 53.5%, as a consequence of the gradual establishment of a vast and useless welfare state system from the 1960s onwards and the adoption of pernicious deficit-financed Keynesian expansionary policies; during the same period, «social» spending relative to GDP doubled.27 Significantly, this spending expansion was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in the tax burden: the latter rose merely from 25.7% in 1960 to 34.6% in 1985, compared to a European average of 41% and a French figure of 45%, generating the structural mismatch between revenue and expenditure that lies behind the abnormal growth of the Italian public debt.28 In 2024, according to Istat data, total general government expenditure stood at 50.6% of GDP, against a tax burden of 42.6% and public debt rising to 135.3% of GDP.29

PART III — COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: SPAIN / ITALY
12. Comparative synoptic overview
12.1 Personal income tax (IRPF / IRPEF)
Year of introduction: Spain 1978 (Ley 44/1978); Italy 1974 (Presidential Decree 597/1973, in force from 1.1.1974).
Previous regime: Spain — Francoist real/in rem taxes, non-comprehensive; Italy — real taxes (movable wealth, buildings, land) + progressive supplementary tax.
Initial brackets: Spain 28 (15%–65.5%); Italy 32 (10%–72%).
Current brackets: Spain 6 state brackets + tramo autonómico (19%–47%); Italy 3 (23%–43%).
«Turning point» reform towards reduced progressivity: Spain — 2006–2007 (Solbes reform): capital income taxed at a flat 18%; Italy — 1983 (Spadolini reform): from 32 to 9 brackets; 1990s: lowering of the top bracket threshold from 1 million to €75,000.
Decentralisation: Spain — extensive devolution of regulatory powers to the Autonomous Communities since 1997 (pronounced territorial disparity); Italy — regional and municipal surtaxes, but less autonomy over the base rate compared to Spain.
Distinctive feature: Spain — separate flat-rate taxation of capital income since 2006 («dual income tax»); Italy — substitute/lump-sum regimes for the self-employed and high-income new residents (optional flat tax).
12.2 Value added tax (VAT)
Year of introduction: Spain 1986 (EEC accession); Italy 1973 (harmonisation in advance of accession).
Tax replaced: Spain — Impuesto General sobre el Tráfico de Empresas (ITE, 1964–1985); Italy — Imposta Generale sull'Entrata (IGE, 1940–1972, «cascading» tax).
Initial standard rate: Spain 12%; Italy 12%.
Current standard rate: Spain 21% (since 2012); Italy 22% (since 2013).
Overall increase in standard rate: Spain +9 points in 40 years; Italy +10 points in 53 years.
Current reduced / super-reduced rates: Spain 10% / 4%; Italy 10% / 4%.
Last major increase: Spain 2012, sovereign debt crisis; Italy 2011–2013, sovereign debt crisis.
12.3 Public spending as a percentage of GDP
1960: Spain ≈ 13–15%; Italy 29%.
1970/1975: Spain 22.5% (1970) / ≈ 25% (1975); Italy ≈ 33–35% (1973).
1980–1985: Spain ≈ 34–37%; Italy ≈ 42–48%.
1990: Spain 43.3%; Italy 53.5% (historical peak).
2000–2007: Spain 38–42%; Italy ≈ 46–48%.
2009–2012: Spain 46–48%; Italy ≈ 50–51%.
2020 (Covid): Spain > 52%; Italy ≈ 57%.
2024: Spain 45.5%; Italy 50.6%.
Public debt 2024–2025: Spain 100.8% of GDP (2025); Italy 135.3% of GDP (2024).

13. Concluding remarks
A comparison of the two Mediterranean tax trajectories reveals, rather than divergence, a structural synchrony with a chronological lag: republican Italy anticipated Spain's transition reforms by about five years in terms of IRPEF and by thirteen years in terms of VAT. However, both answered the same exogenous driver—harmonisation with the Community tax system and the enhancement of the public apparatus's extractive capacity with respect to citizens' wealth and incomes—and shared an identical internal arc: the birth of a comprehensive and sharply progressive income tax (over 28–32 brackets, top rates exceeding 65%), followed by a long-term convergence towards 3–6 brackets and top rates between 43% and 47%.

In terms of indirect taxation, the convergence is even more striking: both countries began with a standard VAT rate of 12% and ended up, in the wake of the 2011–2012 sovereign debt crisis, with a rate between 21% and 22%, with identical reduced (10%) and super-reduced (4%) rates—proof, if any were needed, of the degree of harmonisation attained by the common European VAT system, even between countries with very different starting fiscal histories (Italy's «cascading» IGE versus Spain's single-stage ITE).

The most substantial difference, by contrast, lies in the size of the State: Italy systematically exhibits public expenditure levels relative to GDP that are 5–8 percentage points higher than Spain's across every comparable historical period (53.5% versus 43.3% in 1990; 50.6% versus 45.5% in 2024), despite a relatively more muted increase in the tax burden compared to spending growth—hence the vast discrepancy in their debt-to-GDP ratios (Italy's 135.3% versus Spain's 100.8%). In terms of a comparative constitutional political economy analysis, the Italian case offers a textbook illustration of the thesis that public expenditure expansion, when unaccompanied by a corresponding and concurrent hike in the tax burden, structurally translates into an intergenerational transfer of the tax burden via public debt—a phenomenon far less pronounced in the Spanish trajectory, which, while later to develop, remained better anchored (barring the 2008–2012 interlude) to fiscal discipline.

In the transition from the Francoist and Fascist dictatorships, one easily recognises a common trait in both countries: the dramatic expansion of the extractive capacity of the ruling kleptocratic classes, who regarded the progressive and resolute increase in the share of wealth seized from individuals and transferred to the state apparatus as the defining hallmark of fiscal evolution in both countries.

One of the most intriguing points of comparison regarding the tax burden imposed on citizens is the economic assessment of the slave economy and the proportion of daily labour devoted by slaves to their own subsistence compared to the share expropriated by their masters.

Two seminal studies address the degree of exploitation historically endured by slaves: the controversial Time on the Cross by Robert Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, and How the World Works by Paul Cockshott. The authors attempted, using different methodologies, to calculate the rate of exploitation of slaves—that is, the proportion of servile labour dedicated to the upkeep of the slave himself versus that appropriated by the master. These are, naturally, very challenging if not impossible calculations to perform, but the authors put forward reconstructions. In Fogel and Engerman's view, the rate of exploitation of slaves on southern plantations was, all things considered, low, standing at around 10% of the income produced. Cockshott provides a much broader reconstruction, examining medieval serfdom and modern capitalism as well. For English feudalism (Domesday Book, Essex, 1086), he calculates an exploitation rate ranging between a lower bound of 3% (which he himself considers implausible) and an upper bound of 21.2%; for contemporary capitalism, applying the mark-up method, he identifies exploitation rates of between 50% and over 100%, markedly higher than feudal levels. Tellingly, on socialist economies, Cockshott offers no numerical figures, arguing that the extraction of surplus there occurs via the direct, planned allocation of labour rather than through a price mechanism. It will probably never be possible to reconstruct the exact «rate» of exploitation levied on slaves, but whether we accept Fogel and Engerman's lower bound of around 10% or, along with the fiercest critics of their thesis, much higher figures, it is easy to conclude that the rate of exploitation perpetrated against their own citizens by supposedly «free» countries such as Spain and Italy, when compared to that imposed by the dictatorships—Francoist and Fascist—leads to the obvious conclusion that the margin of autonomy and freedom left by the dictators to their citizens was markedly superior to that left to them by democracies.

This is no historical or statistical anomaly, but the necessary outcome of the progressive democratisation of these nations. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe observed,30 the transition from monarchies to democracies is characterised by a fundamental shift in the relationship between the sovereign and the State. The absolute king held a monopoly on fiscal extortion against his citizens, exactly as democratically elected parliaments and governments do today. Yet there was a crucial and fundamental difference: the king was the owner of the State, possessing it for himself and his heirs. This fostered a natural inclination in the monarch towards the prudent management of his resources and, in particular, towards fiscal restraint, in the knowledge that subjects excessively oppressed by the tax burden would attempt to circumvent the law—damaging the entire legal system, undermining its claim to represent justice and its uniform, impartial application—or would flee the ruler's domain to forge a life in less oppressive lands. By contrast, a democratically elected president or prime minister is not the owner, but merely the temporary caretaker or usufructuary of a country. They can pocket the fruits of fiscal pillage, but they do not become owners of the capital represented by the State, nor can they bequeath it to their heirs. This triggers a decisive increase in rulers' time preference: they will tend to seize the largest possible share of resources in the shortest possible time, and in any event within the time horizon defined by the next elections. The only way to increase the political class's income at the expense of citizens before the next election is through the constant, substantial increase of tax rates. Furthermore, in order to profit from the costs of state administration, democratic rulers face a strong incentive to multiply the functions of the State. Even assuming a caste of incorruptible rulers exercising their duties with absolute honesty—an assumption patently devoid of the slightest realism and thoroughly detached from empirical experience—the managers of the functions assumed by the State will not perform them for free; they will be remunerated for their work. This not only makes these functions inherently more costly than if they were carried out directly by private individuals, but also fuels a tendency towards the expansion and multiplication of these very functions. The very structure of democracies inevitably drives the expansion of states and the responsibilities they progressively arrogate to themselves, and alongside this, the rise in the average tax burden and the weight of the State upon the lives and economic freedom of citizens.

This evolution inevitably trends towards an equilibrium point: the stage at which there is no longer any incentive to work more or start a business because doing so would result in a net decrease in disposable income.31 Once this equilibrium point is crossed, the obvious consequence is a decline in the tax revenue available to the ruling kleptocracies. Citizens will choose tax evasion, closing their businesses, or refraining from work as the most rational response, leading to the overall impoverishment of the countries concerned and the subsequent drop in tax receipts. Reaching this breaking point and the predominance of the incentive not to work and not to produce sparks an increasingly acute social conflict between net recipients of tax revenues (the political class, subsidised business owners, public sector employees) and net taxpayers (private sector employees and entrepreneurs).

Drawing a historical comparison, the middle and late Roman Empire experienced an essentially identical trajectory.32 Once the era of adoptive emperors had ended, from the beginning of the third century onwards, uncertainty regarding tenure of power and the sitting monarch's inability to bequeath the Roman state to his heirs led to a sharp increase in public spending accompanied by a net rise in taxation. This triggered a reaction remarkably similar to that seen today: tax evasion, the abandonment of cities and economic activities, and the welcoming of barbarian invaders—whose primitive state structures knew nothing of taxation—as liberators from imperial fiscal oppression.

Returning to the Italian and Spanish cases, the breaking point is close at hand. Despite a net positive balance in terms of the growth in the absolute number of enterprises, recent decades have witnessed a decline in sole proprietorships and professional practices and a corresponding growth in larger, more structured firms better equipped to withstand the fiscal onslaught.33 From another perspective, an ever-increasing number of Italian and Spanish citizens, especially among those with high skills and education levels, are opting for emigration as the answer to working conditions—whether self-employed or salaried—deemed excessively punitive at home.34

The increasingly stifling and unbearable weight of the state upon citizens' freedom does not stop at the tax burden alone. The loss of disposable time suffered by citizens, sacrificed to the time required to comply with the state bureaucracy, is rising constantly35 and generates an outcome that, in its effects, is little different from fiscal plunder. The sphere of liberty within which individuals can structure their lives according to their desires and aspirations continues to shrink. Moreover, bureaucratisation—which now encompasses the public sector and the so-called private sector alike36—is one of the ways states react to the mounting fiscal crisis generated by the insatiable appetites of the public sector and the objective limits on the resources that can be extracted from the productive class. The illusion harboured by monopolists of decision-making and violence is that they can bolster tax receipts through the ever-tighter surveillance of every sphere of human activity.

The Italian and Spanish situations, which mirror what is happening in many other Western nations, demonstrate that the arc of these states is entering its final stage. Like the Roman Empire, which collapsed not so much from barbarian invasions as from the bureaucratic bloat it took on from the third century onwards, so-called Western democracies are sliding towards an increasingly obvious decline, exacerbated by the very existence of welfare programmes that, besides being unsustainable even for native populations alone, act as an irresistible magnet for inhabitants of regions—especially in Africa and Asia—where productive capacity and accumulated capital cannot generate the resources needed to subsidise those who produce nothing. It is hardly surprising that countries such as Spain or Italy, where one can live at the expense of taxpayers by drawing various handouts organised by the public sector, are increasingly targeted by those who see an opportunity to be maintained.

The State, as Frédéric Bastiat wrote,37 is that great fiction through which everyone endeavours to live at the expense of everyone else. Until, as is unfolding right before our eyes, resources are simply no longer enough.

Sources and bibliography
Spain — primary legislative sources
Ley 44/1978, de 8 de septiembre, del Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas, BOE núm. 217, de 11 de septiembre de 1978.

Ley 30/1985, de 2 de agosto, del Impuesto sobre el Valor Añadido, BOE núm. 190, de 9 de agosto de 1985.

Ley 37/1992, de 28 de diciembre, del Impuesto sobre el Valor Añadido, BOE núm. 312, de 29 de diciembre de 1992 (current text).

Ley de Medidas Urgentes de Reforma Fiscal, de 14 de noviembre de 1977, BOE núm. 276, de 18 de noviembre de 1977.

Real Decreto-ley 20/2012, de 13 de julio, de medidas para garantizar la estabilidad presupuestaria y de fomento de la competitividad (increase of standard VAT rate to 21%).

Spain — secondary sources and statistics
Banco de España, El gasto público en España desde una perspectiva europea, Documentos Ocasionales n. 2217, 2022.

Comín, F., Historia de la Hacienda pública, II. España (1808–1995), Crítica, Barcelona, 1996.

Carreras, A. – Tafunell, X., Historia económica de la España contemporánea, Crítica, Barcelona, 2004 (2nd ed. 2010).

Domínguez Rodicio, J.R., «Análisis de cuarenta años del IRPF a través de las leyes aplicables», in 50 años de evolución impositiva, AEDAF.

Secretaría General de Presupuestos y Gastos (Ministerio de Hacienda), Comparación del gasto de las Administraciones Públicas de España con la CE, Documento de trabajo D-92009.

Trading Economics, Spain Government Debt to GDP, updated data 2025.

Italy — primary legislative sources
R.D.L. 9 January 1940, no. 2, converted into Law 762/1940 (introduction of the Imposta Generale sull'Entrata).

Enabling Law of 9 October 1971, no. 825 (delegation for tax reform).

D.P.R. 26 October 1972, no. 633, establishing the Imposta sul Valore Aggiunto (in force from 1 January 1973).

D.P.R. 29 September 1973, no. 597, establishing IRPEF (in force from 1 January 1974).

D.P.R. 29 September 1973, no. 598 (IRPEG) and no. 599 (ILOR).

D.P.R. 22 December 1986, no. 917, Testo Unico delle Imposte sui Redditi (TUIR).

Italy — secondary sources and statistics
Corte dei Conti, «Settantacinque anni di IRPEF», Rivista della Corte dei Conti, no. 3/2025.

Panteghini, P.M. – Pellegrino, S., «Le riforme dell'IRPEF: uno sguardo attraverso 45 anni di storia», Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.

Baldini, M. – Giannini, S. – Pellegrino, S., «Progressività dell'Irpef: non dipende dal numero di aliquote», lavoce.info, 14 January 2022.

Department of Finance (MEF), I tributi nella storia d'Italia — sections «1940-1973 IGE», «1973 IVA» and «Anni '70 - La grande riforma tributaria».

ISTAT, National Accounts, years 2023–2024 (press release, September 2025).

State General Accounting Department (MEF), La spesa dello Stato dall'Unità d'Italia, Studi e Documenti.

Osservatorio CPI — Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Serie storiche di finanza pubblica dal 1861: un aggiornamento, 2025.

Notes
1.Impuesto General sobre el Tráfico de Empresas (ITE): «fue el principal impuesto de carácter indirecto existente en España entre 1964 y 1985», in Evolución de los tipos de IVA desde 1986 hasta 2017, Grupo Belmar, grupobelmar.es.
2.«En 1960, el gasto público en porcentaje del PIB era similar al existente en la dictadura de Primo de Rivera. Todos los expertos coinciden en señalar el atraso relativo del sector público español», in La evolución del sector público español en el periodo democrático, Dialnet.
3.«En 1970, el Gasto Público en España representaba solamente el 22,5% del PIB, 14,2 puntos menos que en los cuatro principales países de la CE», in Comparación del gasto de las Administraciones Públicas de España con la CE, Secretaría General de Presupuestos y Gastos.
4.«El 10 de junio de 1973, el ministro y Fuentes Quintana presentaron su proyecto al jefe del Estado, Francisco Franco… provocó el cese fulminante del Monreal Luque y la destrucción de los ejemplares existentes del proyecto de reforma. La dictadura de Franco se mostró incompatible con la existencia de un sistema fiscal universal y progresivo», in Reforma fiscal española de 1977, Wikipedia.
5.«…introduce el Impuesto sobre el Patrimonio, con carácter accesorio a la imposición sobre la renta, y al año siguiente, en 1978, por primera vez, un impuesto único, general, personal, sintético y progresivo sobre la renta», in Evolución legislativa y estructura del impuesto, vLex España; cf. also José Ramón Domínguez Rodicio, «Análisis de cuarenta años del IRPF a través de las leyes aplicables», in 50 años de evolución impositiva, AEDAF.
6.«El primer IRPF tenía 28 tramos y tipos impositivos que iban del 15% al 65,5%… Tenía la obligación de realizar la declaración todo aquel que obtuviera ingresos superiores a 300.000 pesetas. Aunque era un impuesto sobre las personas físicas, el tributo se configuraba como un gravamen que recaía en la unidad familiar», in Evolución histórica del IRPF en España, Aston Dealers.
7.«Uno de los cambios más evidentes a lo largo del tiempo en el IRPF es la reducción de la tarifa y de los tramos. En 1978, el impuesto contaba con 28 escalones, en 1991 ya eran 17 y en 2001 se limitaban a cinco», in Evolución histórica del IRPF en España, Aston Dealers, op. cit.
8.«Noten que si en 1978 el tipo más alto más que cuadruplicaba al más bajo, con esta reforma de Solbes ni duplica», in Historia de la progresividad del IRPF, blog Utópico terminando el prólogo.
9.«El contribuyente Real (mismo poder adquisitivo, salario ajustado año a año por IPC) partía en 1978 de una base liquidable de 3.542€ y un tipo medio del 16,00%. Su carga ha aumentado 7,88 puntos porcentuales, a pesar de que las sucesivas reformas han rebajado nominalmente los tipos», in Cuantificando el impuesto inflacionario: capital humano, Substack «sudapollismo».
10.«El IVA se implantó en España el 1 de enero de 1986, en sustitución del antiguo Impuesto sobre el Tráfico de Empresas (ITE)… Este impuesto (IVA) se reguló a través de la ley 30/1985 del 2 de agosto. Posteriormente fue modificado en 1992 para adaptarse a los parámetros de la Unión Europea», in IVA en España y Andorra: su evolución, Andorra Services; for the current text, cf. Ley 37/1992, de 28 de diciembre, del Impuesto sobre el Valor Añadido, BOE núm. 312, de 29 de diciembre de 1992.
11.«Su andadura comenzó con una tasa del 33%… pero ya en 1992 bajó hasta el 28%… En 1993 este tipo elevado desapareció por completo. No obstante, apareció el tipo superreducido (3%)», in Breve historia del IVA en España.
12.«El tipo general del IVA ha subido desde el 12% en 1986 hasta el 21% en 2025 (9,0 puntos porcentuales)», in Impuesto sobre el Valor Añadido en España: tipos, escalas e histórico; on the 2012 increase, cf. Real Decreto-ley 20/2012, de 13 de julio.
13.«El IVA reducido (10%) se aplica en los alimentos que no tienen reconocido un porcentaje inferior… y el IVA superreducido (4%) se centra en los productos de primerísima necesidad como sería el pan, la leche o los huevos», in Así ha sido la evolución del IVA en España, Newtral.
14.It is no coincidence that only in a country such as Spain could a former Director General of the Tax Agency write a book meaningfully entitled «Impuestos o libertad», directly setting out the mutually exclusive nature of taxation and individual liberty: the higher the former, the more the latter shrinks, almost to the point of extinction. Ignacio Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Impuestos o libertad. La hernia fiscal que estrangula a los españoles, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Gaveta Ediciones 2022.
15.«En el caso español, el gasto público como porcentaje del PIB se situaba ligeramente por debajo del promedio de la UE-28 y de la UE-15: el 42%, frente al 43% y al 46%, respectivamente… superiores a los registrados en… Estados Unidos (38%) o Japón (39%)», in El gasto público en España desde una perspectiva europea, Banco de España, Documentos Ocasionales n. 2217.
16.«España registró una deuda pública del 100,80 por ciento del Producto Interno Bruto del país en 2025… alcanzando un máximo histórico del 119,30 por ciento del PIB en 2020 y un mínimo récord del 16,60 por ciento del PIB en 1980… Gasto Público en % del PIB 45,50», Trading Economics.
17.The latest scandal is the Koldo case, in which the Supreme Court sentenced former minister Ábalos to 24 years and 3 months' imprisonment for corruption and embezzlement: lavanguardia.com.
18.«L'imposta generale sull'entrata, conosciuta anche con l'acronimo IGE, era un'imposta indiretta introdotta in Italia dal R.D.L. 2/1940 (convertito in L. 762/1940) … con l'entrata in vigore dell'IGE, la nozione di «scambio» comprende qualsiasi attività economica», in Imposta generale sulle entrate, Wikipedia; cf. also Treccani, entry «Ige».
19.«Il terzo periodo storico in cui risulta essere suddivisibile il sistema tributario italiano è quello che va dalla Riforma Vanoni del 1951 fino alla prima vera e propria riforma dello stesso realizzata nel 1971, per mezzo della c.d. Riforma Visentini», in Riforma fiscale: evoluzione e prospettive, thesis LUISS.
20.«LA RIFORMA DEL 1973-74… La riforma è preceduta dai lavori della «Commissione Cosciani» (1963-1966)», in Il sistema tributario italiano dalla riforma degli anni '70 a oggi, Università di Napoli Federico II.
21.«L'Iva (sostituendo l'IGE, Imposta generale sulle entrate) è stata introdotta nell'ordinamento fiscale italiano con D.P.R. n. 633/1972 ed è entrata in vigore il 1° gennaio 1973, al fine di adeguare il sistema tributario italiano a quello degli altri Stati membri della Comunità Europea», Dipartimento delle Finanze — MEF, «1973 IVA, Imposta sul valore aggiunto».
22.«…con la sostituzione delle vecchie imposte reali (ricchezza mobile, fabbricati, terreni, redditi agrari) e personali (complementare sul reddito, imposta di famiglia), con le nuove sul reddito delle persone fisiche (IRPEF) e delle persone giuridiche (IRPEG) (D.P.R. 29 settembre 1973, nn. 597 e 598) nonché locale sui redditi (ILOR) (D.P.R. 29 settembre 1973, n. 599)», Dipartimento delle Finanze — MEF, «Anni 70 - La grande riforma tributaria».
23.«Nel periodo 1974-1982, l'Irpef prevedeva 32 aliquote che variavano tra il 10 e il 72 per cento (la riduzione della progressività formale avverrà poi solamente nel 1983, quando le aliquote passarono da 32 a 9)», M. Baldini, S. Giannini, S. Pellegrino, «Progressività dell'Irpef: non dipende dal numero di aliquote», lavoce.info, 14 January 2022.
24.In the 1990s, the legislature, anxious to increase revenue—that is, the portion of national income available to the political class rather than citizens—intervened with a series of reforms that caused a significant increase in the tax burden on the middle classes; the primary lever used was the progressive reduction of the income threshold above which the top rate applied, which across four successive interventions was lowered from 1 million to 75 thousand euros. Corte dei Conti, «Settantacinque anni di IRPEF», Rivista della Corte dei Conti no. 3/2025.
25.«…con aliquote variabili del 4%, 10% e 22% a seconda dei beni», in I.V.A. - Storia, caratteri ed aspetti operativi, Skuola.net.
26.«In Francia, Germania, Italia e Regno Unito, i paesi più colpiti dalla guerra, la spesa superò il 25% del PIL», in La spesa pubblica nel XX secolo, Firenze University Press.
27.«Nel trentennio 1960-1990, si assistette ad un progressivo aumento della spesa pubblica, che passò dal 29% del PIL del 1960 al 53,5% del 1990… Come conseguenza, la spesa pubblica in prestazioni sociali in rapporto al Prodotto interno lordo raddoppiò in trent'anni», in Storia del debito pubblico italiano, Wikipedia.
28.«Se il debito aumentò, però, non si assistette ad un aumento proporzionale della pressione fiscale che, dal 25,7% del 1960, ancora nel 1985 era pari al 34,6% del PIL, contro il 41% della media europea e il 45% della Francia», in Storia del debito pubblico italiano, Wikipedia, op. cit.
29.«Nel 2024 le uscite totali delle Amministrazioni pubbliche (50.6% del Pil) sono scese del 3,6% rispetto al 2023… Il debito pubblico è salito al 135,3% del Pil dal 134,6% del 2023. La pressione fiscale è cresciuta di oltre un punto percentuale al 42,6%», Il Sole 24 Ore, «Istat: nel 2024 Pil +0,7% e deficit al 3,4%. La pressione fiscale sale al 42,6%», 3 March 2025.
30.Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy: The God That Failed. The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (NJ), 2001. Italian trans.: Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democrazia: il dio che ha fallito. Il senso economico-politico della transizione da monarchia a democrazia in Occidente, trans. by Alberto Mingardi, preface by Raimondo Cubeddu, with an essay by Alessandro Fusillo, Liberilibri, Macerata, series «Oche del Campidoglio» no. 59, 1st ed. 2006, 3rd ed. 2024, pp. XXXII-450, ISBN 9791280447166.
31.Senate of the Republic, Impact Assessment Office, Fisco. La giungla delle aliquote marginali. Al contribuente conviene sempre lavorare (e guadagnare) di più?, Dossier no. 2135, 17th Leg., on senato.it (accessed 6 August 2026); F. Di Nicola, M. Boschi, G. Mongelli, Le aliquote marginali effettive 2016 nel sistema italiano di imposte e benefici per persone e famiglie, paper presented at the SIEP Annual Meeting, Lecce, 23–24 September 2016, later in la Rivista delle Politiche Sociali / Italian Journal of Social Policy, 3–4/2016; L. Loiacono, L. Rizzo, R. Secomandi, Uno scossone all'IRPEF: detrazione unica per tutti ed imposta negativa, SIEP Working Paper no. 105, 2021, on siepweb.it. M. Pazos Morán, T. Pérez Barrasa, Imposición Efectiva sobre las Rentas Laborales en la Reforma del Impuesto sobre la Renta Personal (IRPF) de 2003 en España, Papeles de Trabajo del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales no. 14/2004, on ief.es; D. Romero Jordán, J.F. Sanz Sanz, Imposición Marginal Efectiva sobre el Factor Trabajo: breve nota metodológica y comparación internacional, in Hacienda Pública Española, 159(4), 2001, pp. 143–166 (with comparative data including Italy); FEDEA, La reducción por rendimientos del trabajo y el tipo marginal efectivo del IRPF, Policy Blog, 13 November 2022, on policy.fedea.net.

The phenomenon whereby, beyond a certain level, an increase in tax rates leads to a reduction in tax revenue is that analysed by the so-called Laffer curve. On the origin and empirical evidence of the Laffer curve, cf. Jude Wanniski, «Taxes, Revenues, and the «Laffer Curve»», The Public Interest, 50, 1978, pp. 3–16 (the article that coined the term); Mathias Trabandt, Harald Uhlig, «How Far Are We from the Slippery Slope? The Laffer Curve Revisited», NBER Working Paper no. 15343, 2009, later in Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(4), 2011, pp. 305–327 (quantitative empirical test for the US and EU-14 area); for the Spanish case, José Félix Sanz Sanz, «La Curva de Laffer: ¿Mito o realidad? Discusión, modelización y evidencias en el IRPF español», Papeles de Economía Española, no. 154, 2017, pp. 179–197; Osservatorio CPI - Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, La curva di Laffer e la flat tax, 2018 (citing, among other things, the IGM Forum survey of US economists, in which 71% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that a tax cut would pay for itself through higher revenue).
32.Lactantius, De mortibus persecutorum, ch. VII, stating that, with the armies multiplied by the Diocletianic tetrarchy, taxpayers became fewer in number than those drawing salaries from the State, resulting in the abandonment of cultivated fields (agri deserti) under the burden of taxation. For the critical Latin text: J. Moreau (ed.), Lactance, De la mort des persécuteurs, Sources Chrétiennes 39, Paris, Cerf, 1954, 2 vols.; J.L. Creed (ed. and trans.), Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum, Oxford Early Christian Texts, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. For the public-domain English translation: W. Fletcher (trans.), Of the Manner in Which the Persecutors Died, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. VII, Buffalo, Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1886, ch. VII. For the Italian edition: Lattanzio, Come muoiono i persecutori, ed. by M. Spinelli, Città Nuova, Rome, 2004–2005.

L. von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949, ch. XXX, § 2 («The Market's Reaction to Government Interference»), pp. 767–769 of the Yale ed.—where Mises, while attributing the crisis primarily to price controls and currency debasement in the 3rd and 4th centuries rather than fiscal pressure alone, describes the flight of the decuriones from the cities and the collapse of the imperial division of labour, referring explicitly to M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1926, p. 187.

M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, op. cit., in particular the chapters on the «Military Monarchy» and the crisis of the third century (vol. I).

For the direct ancient source behind the theme of flight to the barbarians to escape Roman taxation: Orosius, Historiarum adversum paganos libri VII, VII, 41 (c. 417 AD); and Salvian of Marseille, De gubernatione Dei, book V.

For a more recent and less «Austrian» reading: A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284–602: A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey, Blackwell, Oxford, 1964.

For a popular reappraisal in explicitly Misesian terms: H.F. Sennholz, Inflation and the Fall of the Roman Empire, Mises Institute.
33.Istat, Demografia d'impresa, historical series on Asia Registry, years 2015–2024 (birth, death, and survival rates by cohort, sector, and territorial division); Unioncamere-InfoCamere, Movimprese, quarterly survey on the Chamber of Commerce Business Register, series available since 1995; InfoCamere, L'evoluzione del tessuto imprenditoriale italiano 2016-2025, prepared for Il Sole 24 Ore, February 2026. INE, Directorio Central de Empresas (DIRCE), annual press releases (series available since 1999); INE, Demografía Armonizada de Empresas; Funcas, El dinamismo empresarial después de las crisis recientes, 2024; Banco de España, La evolución de la solvencia y de la demografía empresarial en España desde el inicio de la pandemia, June 2022.
34.Istat, Registrations and deregistrations for transfer of residence abroad (AIRE data 2024: net balance of -21,000 graduates aged 25–34; 10.4% of Italian PhDs employed abroad), and Fondazione Migrantes, Rapporto Italiani nel Mondo 2025; for Spain, INE, Padrón de Españoles Residentes en el Extranjero (3,045,966 Spanish citizens resident abroad as of 1 January 2025, +4.7% over 2024), and Banco de España, Los flujos migratorios en España durante la crisis, Boletín Económico, 2015.
35.CGIA di Mestre (Research Department), estimates based on analyses by The European House-Ambrosetti and Istat, Il costo della burocrazia sulle imprese, 2023–2025 (€57.2 billion/year, equal to around 3.3% of GDP according to the most conservative estimate; broader estimates, including the cost to households, reach €184–225 billion/year, roughly 11 percentage points of GDP); Confartigianato, Rapporto sulla burocrazia 2025 (238–312 hours/year devoted to administrative compliance by small business owners, against an OECD average of 56 hours); Bank of Italy, cited in CNA analysis. ATA (Federación Nacional de Asociaciones de Trabajadores Autónomos), Barómetro ATA, December 2025 (200 hours/year and €3,000/year per self-employed worker devoted to trámites burocráticos); Instituto Juan de Mariana and CEU-CEFAS, Desenredar España, 2026 (costi a